YAD VASHEM ARCHIVES
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(Note:  The materials in this section were transcribed by Mr. Kenneth McVay
of Vancouver, Canada.  Mr. McVay's award-winning Nizkor Project is one of
the largest collections of Holocaust-related materials in the world. BSA)
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CAMPS - 1
                       THE NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 
 
              Structure and Aims * The Image of the Prisoner 

                          The Jews in the Camps 
 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH YAD VASHEM INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL CONFERENCE 
                         Jerusalem, January 1980 
                                YAD VASHEM 
                              JERUSALEM 1984 
 
                             SEVENTH SESSION 
                           Chairman: Bela Vago 
 
          JEWISH PRISONER UPRISINGS IN THE TREBLINKA AND SOBIBOR 
                           EXTERMINATION CAMPS 
 
YITZHAK ARAD 
 
A. "Operation Reinhard" Camps 
 
The Erection of the Camps 
 
          At the same time that preparations were being made for the  
destruction of the Jews in the General-Government in Poland, in what was
called Operation Reinhard (Einsatz Reinhard), three death camps were being  
erected in the Lublin region--at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka.  The first
camp, at Belzec, was set up alongside the Tomaszow-Lwow railroad and went
into operation in March 1942; the second, Sobibor, was erected near the
Brest-Litovsk-Wlodawa-Chelm railway line and became operational in April
1942; the third, Treblinka, was set up near the Warsaw-Bialystok railway
and started operating on July 23, 1942.  These three camps were placed
under the command of the SS and Police Leader of the Lublin district (SS
und Polizeifu"hrer--SSPF), SS General Odilio Globocnik, even though the
Treblinka camp was located in territory under the control and
responsibility of the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw district.  The
intention was to concentrate all the annihilation activities of Operation
Reinhard under a unified command. 
 
     The key people and professional staff at Operation Reinhard
headquarters and the staff of the camps came from the T-4 organization,
which had conducted Operation Euthanasia--the killing of mental patients
and the chronically ill in the Reich.  These activities had been stopped in
the fall of 1941 in the wake of pressure from church groups and public
opinion in Germany.  Himmler made ninety-two of the 400 people in the T-4
organization available to Globocnik.  The key member of the group of
transferred personnel was Sturmbannfu"hrer Christian Wirth.  Wirth and his
men had technical and professional experience in killing people by gas. 
This was the method they had used in Operation Euthanasia and which they
now introduced in Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka.  Wirth was commandant of
the Belzec camp, the first that was put into operation, and served in that
post until August 1, 1942.  At that time he was appointed supervisor of the
three camps, with his office located in Lublin.  The first commandant of
the Treblinka camp was Dr. Eberl, and Franz Stangl, who succeeded him, was
the first commandant of the Sobibor camp.  They, too, had been on the staff
of Operation Euthanasia. 

     The three camps were erected according to the same basic plan, and  
Sobibor and Treblinka were virtually identical in structure (see the   
following sketch of the Treblinka camp)[Not included in this transcription. 
knm].  They occupied a relatively small area, from one-quarter to one-half
sq.  km.  (about the size of a football field).  The camp was divided into
two separate sub-camps.  each having its own distinct function.  Camp A
included the railway platform, the staff housing, the quarters of the
Jewish prisoners, the camp offices, warehouses, and an open square for
handling the people who arrived on the transports and for dealing with
their belongings.  Camp B, called the "extermination area," included the
gas chambers.  burial pits, fire pits for burning the corpses, and the
quarters of the Jewish prisoners who were employed at various jobs in this
part of the camp.  A narrow path, from 2 to 4 meters wide, fenced on both
sides and running for about 100 meters, led from the area where the victims
had to undress to the gas chambers in the extermination area.  This path
was called Heaven Street (Himmelstrasse) or The Tube (Schlauch).  Both
sections of the camps were surrounded by two or three barbed-wire fences,
some of which were camouflaged with tree branches so that it was impossible
to observe from outside what was going on inside the camp.  The
extermination area and the path leading to it were also blocked off from
the rest of the camp with fences, tree branches, and earth embankments, so
that even from the other parts of the camp it was not possible to see what
was going on there.  
  
The Camp Staff  
  
     The permanent staff of each of the Operation Reinhard death camps was
comprised of German SS men and Ukrainians.  In addition, Jewish prisoners
were kept and employed for various tasks.  
  
The SS Staff  
  
     The number of SS people ranged from twenty to thirty.  The SS people
occupied the command and administrative positions in the camp and were
responsible for the various installations, which were operated by the
Ukrainians or by the Jewish prisoners.  The camp commanders had the rank of
Hauplsturmfuhrer--Stangl in Treblinka, Reichleitner in Sobibor and Hering
in Belzec.  The assistant camp commanders Kurt Franz in Treblinka and
Niemann in Sobibor had the rank of Untersturmfu"hrer.  The remaining SS
people bore a variety of ranks, Unterscharfu"hrer, Scharfu"hrer,
Oberscharfu"hrer.  All the SS in the camp wore grey army-like uniforms.  
  
The Ukrainian Staff  
  
     On the staff of each of the camps there were approximately 80-120  
Ukrainians.  Their main job was to guard the camp.  They manned the guard
towers and other positions and patrolled along the fences between
positions.  When transports arrived the Ukrainians provided armed cover at
the railway platform, in the reception square and along the path to the gas
chambers (the guarding of the train on its way to the camp was carried out
by a different guard unit and was not the camp's responsibility).  They
also guarded within the camp and prevented contact between the Jews in the
camp and those in the extermination area, and operated the motors that
supplied the gas for the gas chambers.  Like the German personnel, they,
too, took part in the shooting executions.  The Ukrainian staff in the
death camps had been organized beforehand and had been trained in the
Trawniki camp near Lublin.  Some of them were Soviet prisoners of war and
some were local Ukrainians who volunteered for the German service.  Among
the Ukrainians there were also Volksdeutsche from Soviet areas.  They wore
black uniforms, and their personal weapon was a service rifle.  Some of the
guard towers manned by the Ukrainians were equipped with machine guns.  
  
     The Jewish Prisoners.  The number of Jewish prisoners kept for various
service jobs in the camp ranged from 700 to 1,000, with about 600-700 in
camp A and 150-300 in camp B.  
  
     The Jews in the first group were divided into two groups: the first  
was facetiously called the "court Jews" (Hofjuden) and the second was  
called the "square Jews" (Platzjudend).  Most of the "court Jews" were
skilled workers or were employed in workshops or in building the camp. 
Compared to the others, their situation was relatively good.  The "Jews 
of the square" were also divided into a number of groups:  one group was
employed on the railway platform when the transports arrived.  Their job
was to remove from the cars the bodies of those who had died en route, to
remove the packages and to clean the cars.  Other groups were positioned in
the square where the Jews were ordered to undress; their job was to sort
and arrange the clothing and belongings and to ready them for shipment to
Germany.  In addition, there were the so-called "gold Jews" who sorted gold
and other valuables, and a group of barbers who sheared the women's hair  
before they were sent to the gas chambers.  From time to time additional
groups of workers were formed for various jobs, including camouflaging the
camp fences with branches brought from the nearby forest, construction,
paving roads in the camp, and the like.  Among the Jewish prisoners there
was also a group of women.  
  
     The Jews who were kept in the extermination area worked mainly at  
removing the dead bodies from the gas chambers and transferring them to 
the pits.  When it was decided to cremate the bodies, on a pile of
discarded old rails set aside especially for that purpose, they were  
also put to work at that.  Another group of working Jews was called the
"dentists"; they extracted gold teeth from the bodies that had been removed
from the gas chambers before they were brought to the pits.  There were
others who worked in the services in the extermination area--the kitchen,
laundry, and the like.  The Germans prevented any contact between the Jews
in the two parts of the camp.  At times Jews were shifted from the first
camp to the second, but never back from there.  To head the group of Jews
the Germans appointed a "camp elder" (Lagera"lteste), or, as he was
sometimes called, "head Capo" (Oberkapo).  Each of the two parts of the
camp had its own "camp elder," and the Germans also appointed a Jewish  
Capo for each work group.  To keep a check on what the Jewish prisoners
were thinking and doing, the SS found informers among them, but the
prisoners quickly learned to recognize these informers and to take
precautionary measures.  
  
     The relatively small size of the camp and the manner in which it 
was constructed, including the system of barbed-wire fences and the guard  
towers, which provided an unobstructed view of the camp area, plus the size
of the German and Ukrainian staff and its activity in all parts of the
camp, enabled maximum control and surveillance of the goings-on in the camp
and of the movement of Jewish prisoners.  The only places where the Jews
were not under constant observation were the workshops in the daytime and
the barracks at night.  But the Germans paid frequent visits there, too,
and the presence of informers facilitated surveillance of what was going on
inside.  
  
Secrecy and Deception as the Major Principle in the Operation of the German
Annihilation Apparatus  
  
     In order to understand why the uprisings in Sobibor and Treblinka  
were carried out by the few hundred Jews retained to work in the camp  
and not by the hundreds of thousands brought there for extermination,  
we must consider the system of secrecy and deception and the technique of
extermination used by the Nazis.  We must also deal with the question of
what was known to the Jews who were brought on the transports of the fate
awaiting them.  
  
     The decisions reached at the highest levels of the Third Reich about  
the destruction of the Jews and the instructions for carrying them out,
which were passed on to the lower levels of the German administration were
a closely guarded state secret.  The concentration of the Jews in their
various countries of residence in occupied Europe and their transport in
trains to the annihilation camps in Poland engaged a large bureaucratic and
operational apparatus that included both Germans and non-Germans.  Many SS,
local police officials, government officials and railroad workers were part
of this apparatus.  Yet despite the involvement of thousands of people in
these activities, the Nazis succeeded in keeping the purpose of the
transports, their real destination, and the fate awaiting the deportees a
secret, even from parts of the Nazi apparatus that dealt directly with the
deportations and transportation of the Jews to the death camps.  Those
levels and sections within the Nazi annihilation apparatus that knew the
truth about the destination of the transports kept this secret very well. 
In fact, the SS who took part in Operation Reinhard were required to 
sign a special declaration of secrecy. 
 
     The millions of Jews who were taken from their places of residence, 
ghettos or transit camps did not in any way know that they were being 
brought to extermination camps nor did they know what fate awaited them. 
Most of them had not even heard of the existence of such camps.  Rumors
about the death camps did, it is true, reach Warsaw and other ghettos in
Poland, but the public for the most part did not want to believe them. 
Even most of those who escaped from the trains that were on their way to
the extermination camps did not know the trains' real destination. 
 
     More than one-quarter of a million Jews from the Warsaw ghetto, who 
from July to September 1942 were brought to Treblinka--which was only 
80 kilometers from Warsaw--did not know what fate awaited them.  When 
they got off the train at the camp platform they were met by a heavy guard
of SS men and Ukrainians, but their eyes immediately encountered the large
sign announcing the following in Polish and German: 
 
          Jews of Warsaw, for your attention!  You are in a transit camp
     (Durch-gangslager) from which you will be sent to a labor camp
     (Arbeitslager).  As a safeguard against epidemics you must immediately
     hand over your clothing and parcels for disinfection.  Gold, silver,
     foreign currency and jewelry must be placed with the cashier, in
     exchange for a receipt.  These will be returned to you at a later time
     upon presentation of the receipt.  For bodily washing before
     continuing with the journey all arrivals must attend the bathhouse. 
     (Adalbert Ruckerl, Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungslager im Spiegel
     deutscher Strafprozesse--Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Chelmno, Munich,
     1977, 219) 
 
     This announcement was also delivered to the prisoners orally by a SS 
officer, who also announced that the old and sick for whom walking was
difficult would be transferred to a field hospital (lazarett) near the
train platform; they would be assisted by Jews who worked in the camp.  He
promised that in the hospital the old and infirm would receive medical
attention. 
 
     From the moment a "shipment" of several thousand people set foot on 
the platform until its total liquidation in the gas chambers, no more 
than an hour or an hour and a half passed, sometimes even less.  During
that time the men were separated from the women and children; they were
ordered to undress, and their clothing was arranged in packages; they
handed over their valuables; the women's hair was shorn, and the people
were led to the "showers," which of course were the gas chambers.  They
were forced to do all of these things at a run, under a hail of shouts,
blows and bullets from the So men and the Ukrainians, and the barking and
biting of dogs.  The suddenness and speed with which all of this was done,
the constant running, and the atmosphere of terror and threat put the
people in a state of shock that kept them from thinking about what was
happening around them or from taking any action of resistance. 
      
     This method was used with all the extermination transports that 
arrived in sealed freight cars in the latter part of 1942 from the
territory of the General-Government in Poland and from the occupied 
territories of the Soviet Union.  A slightly different method was used 
for transports that arrived from Western Europe, the territory of the 
Third Reich, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans from the end of 1942 until 
the middle of 1943.  These transports arrived in passenger cars.  Upon
arrival they found an "ordinary" railway Station with signs pointing to
ticket windows, tables indicating the departure times of trains to various
destinations and other normal station installations --all, of course, fake. 
The alighting from the train was carried out in a polite and calm manner. 
The camp personnel encouraged the arrivals to write postcards to their
families and friends telling them that they had come to a labor camp; they
were even given an address for receiving mail (those arriving in Sobibor 
were told to write Arbeitslager Wlodawa [Wlodawa Labor Camp]). 
 
     After the postcards were sent, everything having been done in a 
peaceful and polite atmosphere, the situation changed radically: a torrent
of shouts, blows, dog bites and bullets rained down on the people, who were
stricken by an even greater shock and paralysis than that felt by the Jews
from Poland and the Soviet Union.  In this way they were driven toward the
gas chambers. 
 
     It is thus clear why those hundreds of thousands of Jews were unable 
to organize and respond.  It is equally clear why the underground that
carried out the uprisings was formed by some of those few Jews who had been
selected from the transports to work for a certain period at various jobs
in the camp.  They came to know what was happening in the camps and what
fate awaited them; in addition, they had the time to organize their
resistance. 

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CAMPS - 3

                       THE NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 
 
   Structure and Aims * The Image of the Prisoner The Jews in the Camps 
 
                   PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH YAD VASHEM 
                   INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL CONFERENCE 
                         Jerusalem, January 1980 


YAD VASHEM 
JERUSALEM 1984 
SEVENTH SESSION 
Chairman: Bela Vago 
 
JEWISH PRISONER UPRISINGS IN THE TREBLINKA AND SOBIBOR EXTERMINATION CAMPS 
 
YITZHAK ARAD 
 
B.  Acts of Resistance and the Organization of the Revolt in Treblinka 
 
     The organization of the underground was preceded by some successful 
and some unsuccessful acts of resistance and escape attempts.  These
actions were followed by cruel reprisals and punishment by the camp 
authorities.  The lessons learned from these actions influenced the modes
of operation of the underground and its plans. 
 
     The first act of resistance, which is mentioned in many testimonies, 
was the killing of SS Unterscharfu"hrer Max Bialas by the Jew Meir Berliner
on September 10 or 11, 1942.  Meir Berliner had arrived in Treblinka from
Warsaw a few days before in one of the transports of the "big Aktion." At
that time it was the practice to take out several hundred people from each
transport to work arranging the belongings of the murdered; the same day or
a few days later, the group was liquidated and was replaced by other people
selected from new shipments.  At the evening roll-call of the prisoners,
Max Bialas instructed those who had arrived that same day to line up on the
side.  It was not clear who was to be liquidated --the new arrivals or
those who had arrived earlier.  At that moment Berliner jumped out from the
ranks of the prisoners, lurched toward Bialas and stabbed him with a knife. 
A great commotion followed.  The Ukranian guards opened fire.  Berliner was
killed on the spot.  and in the course of the shooting more than ten other
prisoners were killed and others were wounded.  When the tumult subsided
the prisoners were lined up again for roll-call.  Christian Wirth, who was
in Treblinka at the time, arrived on the scene accompanied by Kurt Franz,
the second in command of the camp.  Ten men were removed from the ranks and
shot on the spot in full view of all the others.  On the following day,
during the morning roll-call, another 150 men were taken out, brought to
the Lazarett and shot there.  Max Bialas died en route to the military 
hospital in Ostrow.  (Ibid., 231-232; Testimony of Eliyahu Rosehberg, 
Yad Vashem Archives, hereafter, YVA), 0-3/4039.) 
 
     Following this event a new practice was introduced; a permanent group
of Jewish prisoners was now retained in the camp to carry out all physical
labor.  The daily executions of Jewish prisoners was now of limited scope
and encompassed mainly the infirm and weak who were no longer able to work
and those who had committed violations even of the most minor sorts.  The
place of those who were killed was taken by new men selected from the
transports slated for annihilation, which continued to stream into the
camp. 
 
     The lesson learned by the Jewish prisoners who worked in the camp was 
that the cost of a courageous act like that performed by Berliner was very
high--more than 160 Jews were executed in reprisal for the killing of one
SS man.  In light of the fact that the Germans had also changed their
methods, instances of this sort did not recur.  It became clear that
individual, spontaneous acts like that of Berliner, however admirable, were
not the way to rescue, nor could they even slow down the annihilation
activities in the camp.  

     In his book 'A Year in Treblinka', Jacob Wiernik tells of another 
act of individual resistance.  One of the girls being herded into the 
gas chambers grabbed a rifle from the hands of a Ukrainian guard, shot 
and killed one Ukrainian and wounded two others.  The girl was caught,
tortured and murdered.  (The testimony of Jacob Wiernik was taken down 
in Warsaw during the war and in 1944 was published in Poland by the 
Polish underground.  His testimony also appeared in Yiddish in New York;
see Jacob Wiemili, 'A Yor in Treblinke', New York, 1944, 30.) 
 
     Group Resistance by Jews who Arrived in the Transports In December
1942 a transport of about 2,000 Jews arrived in Treblinka from Kiellbasin
camp in the Grodno district.  Jews from Grodno and the towns of the region
had been concentrated in this camp.  Unlike other transports, most of which
arrived during the daylight hours, this one arrived in the evening.  The
people were taken off the train and brought into the camp surrounded by SS
and Ukrainian guards.  The handling of this transport, like the others, was
accompanied by shouts, blows and firing into the air.  The people were
ordered to undress, and some of them had already begun to run on the
Himmelstrasse toward the gas chambers.  At this point it became clear 
to the people where they were and what awaited them.  Shouts were heard:
Don't obey the Germans!  Don't undress!  Scores of people from the
transport grabbed sticks, pulled out knives and fell on the Germans and
Ukrainians who surrounded them.  According to one testimony, one of the
Jews pulled out a grenade and hurled it at the Germans and Ukrainians, who
opened fire on the crowd with rifles and machine guns.  A great tumult
began as people ran in all directions. But the barbed-wire fences prevented
escape from the camp.  It was not long before the square was covered with
the corpses of the prisoners.  In the end the Germans and Ukrainians
quelled this act of resistance, and the people were shoved into the gas
chambers, some of them still in their clothing.  In this struggle it seems
that three SS men and Ukrainians were injured. 
 
     It should be noted that underground activity, the idea of resistance 
and of going into the forests was very widespread among the Jews of 
Grodno and its surroundings.  Their psychological readiness for 
resistance, the rumors that had reached them about the meaning of 
Treblinka, the situation they encountered after getting off the train 
and the cries of some of them to resist all led to the spontaneous 
outburst.  After that transports to Treblinka were brought in only during
daylight hours.  (ibid., pp.40-411; Shmuel Wilenberg, "Treblinka --
ha-Mahane ve-ha-Mered," Yalkut Moreshet, No.  5, April 1966, pp.  30-31;
testimony of Oskar Strawczynski, YVA, 0-3/3131; pp.17-18.) 
 
Escapes from the Camps 
 
     In the first months of the camp's existence scores of people escaped 
from Treblinka.  Some of them were caught, others managed to get away. 
They reached the nearby ghettos and told what was going on in Treblinka. 
Some of the escapees reached the Warsaw ghetto.  One of the first of these
was Simcha Binem Laski, who was sent to Treblinka from Warsaw at the end of
July 1942.  Four days after he arrived in the camp, Simcha managed to
escape.  He got back to the Warsaw ghetto in the beginning of August--on
the day that the "Children's Aktion" was being carried out there.  ("In
Treblinke--Gviyat Edut," 'Fun Lefstn Khurbn' , No. 3, October-November
1946, pp.47-48.) 
 
     On September 13, 1942, Avraham (Jacob) Krzepicki escaped from 
Treblinka after having been in the camp for eighteen days.  He, too, 
managed to reach the Warsaw ghetto and there provided testimony as to 
what was occurring in Treblinka.  (Krzepicki was a member of the Jewish
Fighting Organization and took part in the fighting in "the brush makers"
area in the Warsaw ghetto.  His testimony in Ringelblum Archives, YVA,
M-10; see also Rachel Auerbach, Varshever Tsevuos--Bagegenishn Aktivinein,
Gorules 1933-1943, Tel Aviv, 1974, p.278.) Several of the escapees from
Treblinka participated in the Warsaw ghetto uprising, among them David
Nowodworski, member of the Jewish Fighting Organization and commander of a
group of fighters, and Lazar Szerszein, who was also the commander of a
group of fighters.  (On David Nowodworski see Ysrael Gutman, Mered
ha-Nazurim. 1963, p.239; Avraham Levin, "Mi-Pinkaso Shel ha-More
mi-Yehudiya." Beit Lohamei ha-Geta'ot, 1969, p.215; on Szerszein see Aryeh
Neiberg, Ha- Aharonim--be-Kez ha-Mered shel Getto Varsha, Tel Aviv, 
1958, p.98; Dokumenty i materialy do dziejow okupacji niemieckiej w 
Polscc (hereafter, Dokumenty), Vol.lI, "Akcje' i wysicdlenia, Warsaw, Lodz. 
Cracow, 1946, p.343.) 
 
     At the time of the deportation of the Jews of Czestochowa, on January 
4, 1943, a Jew by the name of Richter, who had also escaped from Treblinka,
attacked and wounded Lieutenant Rohn, the commander of the gendarmerie that
carried out the deportation.  (Ibid., p. 290.) 
 
     At the end of October or beginning of November, two Treblinka
prisoners, assisted by others, managed to escape on the freight train 
carrying the personal belongings of the murdered out of the camp.  At 
the end of November or beginning of December, seven people from the group
that worked on the station platform were caught trying to escape by train. 
They were taken to the lazarett and shot there by Kurt Franz.  The camp
prisoners were called to a special roll-call which Franz informed them that
for each escapee ten Jews working in the camp would be shot.  (Gitta
Sereny, Into that Darkness--From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder, London,
1974, p.196.) 
 
     At the beginning of winter, under cover of darkness, another four 
prisoners escaped.  They slipped out of the barrack, cut the barbed-wire
fence and got away.  As an immediate reprisal twenty sick people were taken
out and shot on the spot.  (Wilenberg, op.cit., pp.36-37) 
 
     The escape attempts continued, the threats notwithstanding.  Two 
youths from Czestochowa caught trying to escape were hung naked by their
feet.  All the Jews in the camp were forced to witness their torture, and
only after they were kept hanging from their feet for several hours were
they shot to death.  (Testimony of Strawczynski, op.cit., p.29; testimony
of Kalman Tajgman, WA, (0-3/1586.)  

     There were escape attempts also from the camp's extermination area. 
A group of seven people succeeded in digging a tunnel from the barracks
near the camp's southern fence.  In the course of digging, they had to deal
with the serious problem of what to do with the dug-up earth.  They found a
solution to this problem and completed a tunnel 5 meters long, from the
barracks to the outside of the first fence.  The digging was done at night,
during the month of December 1942, and despite the secrecy of the work many
of the men in the barracks --there were then about 250 of them--knew about
it.  They kept the secret, even though they knew that the group's escape
was liable to endanger the others.  The escape was carried out on the night
of December 31, 1942.  Five men succeeded in getting through the tunnel and
out beyond the fences, but then the Ukrainian sentry noticed them and
opened fire.  The entire camp was called into action.  The prisoners were
removed from the barracks and inspected. Five were missing.  It was snowing
that night, but the Germans and Ukrainian guards went in pursuit of the
escapees.  The escapees had reached a nearby village, but were caught while
trying to rent a cart.  One succeeded in escaping, but the other four were
caught after a struggle.  One was shot on the spot, and the other three
were brought back to the camp.  After they were tortured, they were hanged
in full view of all the prisoners, who had been lined up in roll-call 
formation.  The last prisoner to be hanged shouted from the gallows "Down
with the nation of Hitler, long live the Jewish people." (Wiernik, op.
cit., pp.41-42; testimony of Rosenberg, op.cit., pp.9-10.) 
 
     During the existence of the Treblinka camp scores of people did 
succeed in escaping, but scores of others were caught, tortured and
executed.  The possibilities for escape were greater in the early months,
and it was then that most of the successful escapes were carried out.  As
time passed escape became more difficult and more complicated.  Security
measures were improved, and the system of barbed-wire fencing around the
camp was reinforced and improved. There were three fences: an inner
barbed-wire fence 3-4 meters high and camouflaged by tree boughs; a second
network of tank obstacles laid with barbed-wire fencing; and a third, outer
barbed-wire fence. In addition, parts within the camp itself were also
fenced, including the prisoners' quarters.  Six guard towers were erected,
one of them in the center of the extermination area, and, as a result,
there was constant observation of what was going on in the camp during the
day. 
 
     At night the prisoners were shut up in the barracks, which were
guarded by Ukrainian sentries.  The intensified punitive measures-- the
torture and hanging of the captured escapees and the announcement that for
each prisoner who escaped ten others would be executed-- also had their
effect.  The snow and the tracks left in the snow, which gave the escapees
away.  also made escape more difficult. The last escape attempts were made
at the beginning, of the winter, in December 1942, but they ended in
failure.  It became evident that the ways of escape that had been tried
heretofore now stood virtually no chance of succeeding.  It became
necessary to search for different ways, more organized and complex. 
Indeed, at the beginning of 1943, new ideas began to take shape regarding
struggle, escape and rescue.  

The Organization of the Underground 
 
     In the winter of 1942/1943, a change occurred in the intensity of the
activity in Treblinka.  The number of transports gradually diminished and
almost stopped altogether in February/March 1943.  The annihilation of the
Jews of the General-Government was completed  for the most part, although
from time to time a few transports did arrive from the Bialystok-Grodno
district (Generalbezirk).  The vast piles of possessions taken from the
murdered, which had been heaped up in the square near the platform and had
been part of the permanent scenery of the camp, disappeared.  They had been
packed and sent off to destinations in Germany and elsewhere.  As the
stream of transports ceased, it was no longer necessary to sort the
belongings of the dead, and the fear descended on the Jewish prisoners that
they were slated to be liquidated soon, together with the camp as a whole.
Rumors about a selection in which some of the men would be taken to the gas
chambers hovered in the air constantly.  Moreover, the reduced number of
transports led to a shortage of food and clothing, which had been obtained
from what the victims left behind. Starvation and the typhus that broke out
in the winter claimed many victims, and that added to the gloom among the
prisoners. 
 
     The news from the front about the German military defeat at 
Stalingrad--which the prisoners learned about from newspapers smuggled to
them by the boy prisoners who worked in the quarters of the SS--was
received with joy.  At the same time fears intensified that with the end of
Nazi Germany approaching, the last of the Jews would be liquidated. 
(Sereny, op.cit., pp.210-212; testimony of Strawczynski, op.cit. p.26, 47;
Wiernik, op.cit., p.37; J. Rajgrodzki, "Jedenascie miesiecy w obozie
zaglady w Treblince--Wspomnienia," Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu
Historycznego (BZIH), No.25, 1958, p.109.) 

     That was the atmosphere in which the idea of escape and rebellion 
gradually took shape in talks among the prisoners in the work places and
barracks.  The lessons of previous acts of resistance in the camp and the
recent unsuccessful escape attempts made it clear that new ways had to be
found.  The only realistic possibility seemed to be a mass revolt and
organized escape by all the prisoners by means of force. 
 
     When and within which group the idea of rebellion first occurred 
cannot be stated with any certainty.  (According to Strawczynski, op.cit.,
p.47, the idea of revolt was first raised by the carpenters' group.) It
seems reasonable to assume that the idea occurred to several groups at more
or less the same time in talks among the "court Jews" and among the "square
Jews." In preparation for the rebellion, an "organizing committee" was
formed, comprised of prisoners from both groups.  On this committee were
Dr.  Chorazycki, who was physician to the SS men, Zeev Kurland, the Capo of
the Lazarett, Zelo Bloch, a lieutenant in the Czech army who had arrived 
in a transport from Theresienstadt, Salzberg of the tailors' group, the
agronomist Sadowicz and others. 

     Even before the plan for the uprising was formulated, the "organizing
committee" tried to acquire arms by bribing the Ukrainian guards.  These
guards used to slip food to the prisoners in exchange for money and gold,
and it was hoped that they would also agree to supply weapons.  The Jewish
prisoners, especially the "gold Jews," maintained caches of money and
valuables that had been taken from what had been left by the victims.  Even
though the Germans often threatened that prisoners possessing money and
valuables would be executed, the prisoners were not deterred and continued
to hide sizable quantities of money and valuables, Now these holdings were
to serve as a source for the acquisition of arms.  One of the first
attempts was made by a Jewish prisoner named Moshe, who served as the Capo
of the carpentry shop.  He gave an Ukrainian with whom he was in contact
money and asked him to get him a pistol.  The money was taken, but the gun
was not brought.  In spite of this failure, the efforts to acquire arms via
the Ukrainians continued, but it was decided that in addition an attempt
would be made to remove weapons from the camp arms store.  In this luck was
with the prisoners.  One day a Jewish locksmith was ordered to repair the
lock on the arms store door.  In the course of the repair, he prepared a
key for the underground "organizing committee." (Dokumenty, op.cit., Vol. 
I, Obozy, p.188; Wilenberg, op.cit., p.46; Tanhum Greenberg, "Ha-Mered
be-Treblinka--Kitei Edut," Yalkllt Mo-reshet, No. 5, April 1966, p.61) 
 
     In the second half of March 1943, the underground suffered a serious 
loss.  Zelo Bloch, the military man on the "organizing committee," was
transferred to the extermination area.  The reasons for his transfer are
not clear.  It is very unlikely that it was in any way related to his
underground activity, for had there been the slightest suspicion against
him the Germans would have immediately killed him. His transfer was most
likely a result of the lessened activity in the camp and the need for more
men in the extermination area.  After Himmler visited the camp at the end
of February or early March 1943, the burning of the corpses was begun in
the "extermination area" so as to remove traces of the murder that had
taken place there; for this more men were needed.  Typhus also had claimed
many victims in the extermination area, which further increased the
manpower shortage there.  (Sereny, op.cit., pp. 210-211)  Another
underground activist, Adolf Friedman, was transferred together with Block. 
 
     The efforts to get arms from the Ukrainian guards continued.  This 
time Dr.  Chorazycki, one of the heads of the "organizing committee" who by
virtue of his work had daily contact with the Ukrainians, took upon himself
the handling of this matter.  As a bribe for the guards he carried on him a
sum of money.  One day early in April 1943, the deputy camp commander, Kurt
Franz, entered the infirmary and discovered the money (possibly after being
informed by the Ukrainians).  When Chorazycki realized that his situation
was hopeless, he rushed at Franz with a surgical knife.  A struggle ensued
in which Chorazycki did not manage to injure Franz, but did succeed in
swallowing poison that he kept on him for just such an occasion.  The
Germans' efforts to revive him were to no avail.  In order to deter the
other prisoners from thinking about escape they were called to a roll-call
at which the dead body of Chorazycki was abused.  A thorough search was
conducted among the "gold Jews" who were suspected of having supplied the
money.  They were threatened that if they did not confess they would be
executed.  They were severely beaten and tortured, but denied any
connection with the affair. (Greenberg, op.cit., p.60; Wilenberg, op. 
cit., pp. 52-53; testimony of Strawczynski, op.cit., p.38) 
 
     In spite of Chorazycki's death and Zelo Bloch's transfer to the other 
part of the camp, the "organizing committee" continued with the 
preparations for the uprising.  The "camp elder" Rakowski was now 
brought in on the secret of the underground activity.  Rudek Lubernicki,
who was in charge of the garage and later played an important role in the
uprising, now also joined the underground.  The members of the underground,
who numbered several score, were organized into several groups. 
 
     In the latter part of April 1943, it was decided to remove weapons 
from the arms store by using the key in the committee's possession. The
arms store was located between two barracks where Germans lived; there was
access to it also from within the barracks.  The job of removing the
weapons, during the daytime, when the barracks' occupants were not there,
was given to a group of Jewish boys who worked in the SS quarters cleaning
up and polishing the Germans' boots.  A group of boys headed by Markus, a
young man from Warsaw who was in charge of them, and three other boys
removed two cases containing grenades from the storeroom and 
surreptitiously got them to the shoemakers' workshop.  When the grenades
were examined.  it was discovered that the detonators, which were kept in a
separate box, were missing.  The grenades were returned in the same way
they had been removed so that the Germans would not find out that they 
were missing.  This failure led to a postponement of the uprising. 
(Greenberg, op.cit., pp. 61-62.) 

     After the uprising planned for the latter half of April 1943 failed 
to take place, there was a decline in the underground's activity. Once
again there were thoughts of individual escape.  One of those who planned
to escape was Rakowski, together with his girlfriend Cesia Mendel and
others.  Seeking collaboration.  they bribed a Ukrainian guard, but the SS
began to get suspicious.  They conducted a search in the room where the
Capos lived and found large quantities of money and gold in the blankets
and walls.  Rakowski claimed that the treasure they found did not belong to
him and that he was unaware of its existence.  He claimed that the money
and gold had probably been hidden by Chorazycki, who had since died but who
had lived in that room before.  But his arguments were not accepted, and he
was taken to the Lazarett where he was shot.  After Rakowski's death the 
Germans, at the beginning of May 1943, appointed Galewski "camp elder."
(Galewski, an engineer by profession, served as camp elder before Rakowski
; see also testimony of Strawczynski,
op.cit., pp.51-52; Sereny, op.cit., p.195). 
 
     In May and the beginning of June the activity of the "organizing 
committee" and underground activity in general continued to slacken. 
But the cessation of the transports and the information from the
extermination area that the removal of the bodies from the pits and 
their cremation was nearing completion and that soon there would be 
no more "work" led to a reawakening of underground activity. 
 
     At this time the "camp elder" Galewski joined the underground
leadership, and with him came Monik, an energetic Warsaw youth who was 
Capo of the skilled workers, and others as well.  The "organizing
committee" was reactivated.  It was headed by Galewski and had about 
ten members, most of whom had been members of the previous "committee." 
The activity was conducted in the greatest possible secrecy, and the camp
authorities did not learn of it despite the informers they had among the
prisoners.  The fact that the committee was headed by the "camp elder" and
that its members included most of the Capos and heads of work groups
(Kurland, Monik, Sadowicz and others) made its activity somewhat easier. 
'The meetings generally took place in the tailors' workshop.  The number of
members in the underground grew steadily.  On the eve of the uprising, in
Camp A there were about sixty people, who comprised about 10 percent of the
camp's prisoner population.  They were organized by places of work into
sub-units of five to ten people, headed by a commander. (Testimony of
Strawczynski, op cit., pp.50-55; Stanislaw Kon, "Ha-Mered be-Treblinka,"
'Sefer Milhamot ha-Geta'ot, 1954, pp 536-537). 

***************************************************************************
CAMPS - 3


 
                       THE NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 
 
   Structure and Aims * The Image of the Prisoner The Jews in the Camps 
 
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH YAD VASHEM INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL CONFERENCE 
                         Jerusalem, January 1980 

YAD VASHEM 
JERUSALEM 1984 
 
SEVENTH SESSION 
Chairman: Bela Vago 
 
JEWISH PRISONER UPRISINGS IN THE TREBLINKA AND SOBIBOR EXTERMINATION CAMPS 
 
YITZHAK ARAD 
 
        Organization of the Underground in the Extermination Area. 
 
     The underground in the exterminarion area came into being after Zelo 
Bloch and Adolf Friedman, who had been among the leaders of the underground
in area A, were transferred to the extermination area at the end of March
or beginning of April.  Both of them were made leaders of work groups that
were cremating bodies.  Their adjustment to the new situation and the men
took some time, and, consequently, the organization of the underground and
the preparations for the uprising began only toward the end of May/
beginning of June 1943. The members of the underground were formed into
groups of five with each unit assigned different tasks.  As weapons they
had to use the work implements they used for opening up the pits and
burning the bodies--shovels, pitchforks, and axes.  (Rajgrodzki, op.cit.,
pp. 113-114; testimony of Rosenberg, op.cit., p.12.) 
 
     Contact between the two undergrounds was carried out by Jacob Wiernik,
a carpenter who was kept in the extermination area, but, because of his
professional expertise, was brought to work in the other part of the camp
as well.  As he moved between the two parts of the camp, he was able to
transmit information and instructions between the two groups.  (Wiernik,
op. cit., p.45.) 
 
     As the underground in Camp A was larger and had more of a chance to 
obtain weapons, the members of the underground in the extermination area
understood that the chance their activity would succeed depended on
cooperation with the larger underground and, accordingly, they accepted 
its authority. 
 
     In July 1943 the work of burning the bodies was nearing completion. 
In that period a few transports arrived with about 2,000 Gypsies and 
about 1,000 Jews, but they did not alter the decisive fact--the function of
the place as an extermination camp was coming to an end. The SS even had a
party to celebrate the completion of their mission. 

     All that reinforced the feeling that the time for the uprising must 
be moved up.  In the second half of July the prisoners in the extermination
area relayed repeated demands to the leaders of the underground in area A
that they start the revolt without any further delay.  But all they
received in response were assuasive assurances. At this point the people in
the extermination area decided to pass on an ultimatum, accompanied by a
threat, that if the Underground in Camp A would not fix an immediate date
for the revolt, the extermination area underground would launch the
rebellion on its own. (Rajgrodzki, op.cit., p.114; Wiernik, op.cit., pp. 
51-52; testimony of Tajgman, op.cit., p.19; testimony of Abraham Goldfarb,
YVA, 0-3/1846) 

The Revolt Plan 
 
     Pressed by the extermination area underground, the "organizing
committee" in Camp A decided to carry out the uprising on August 2, 1943. 
Word to that effect was transmitted to the extermination area underground
by Wiernik.  (Wiernik, op.cit., pp.56-58) 
 
     At that time there were about 850 Jews in Treblinka, one-third in the 
extermination area.  Several factors were considered in fixing the precise
hour for beginning the revolt.  The uprising plan, which was based on
obtaining arms from the camp arms store, had to take place during the
daytime, when the SS people were not in their quarters. The distribution of
the arms to the various groups and deployment near the targets of attack
could be done more easily during the daytime under the guise of routine
work in the camp.  On the other hand, it was important to begin the
uprising near dusk, so that escape could take place under cover of
darkness, thus hampering the German pursuers.  Another factor was the time
it would take to organize the escape of all the prisoners in the camp--in
addition to the fighters--for it was certain that in reprisal, the Germans
would murder all the remaining prisoners.  All of these considerations 
resulted in 16:30 being set as the hour for the insurrection.  The 
plan for the revolt was as follows: 

Stage A: From 14:00 to 16:30-- Acquisition of Arms and Deployment 
     1.   Removal of the arms from the arms store and their transfer to the
          combat groups' assembly points.  
     2.   Deployment of the combat groups near the targets of 
          attack--the camp headquarters, the quarters of the SS and of the 
          Ukrainians, the guard towers.  
     3.   Quiet elimination of Germans entering workshops and work sites.  

Stage B: Beginning at 16.30--Seizing Control of the Camp and Destroying It
     1.   Attack the camp headquarters and SS people in various places.  
     2.   Cut telephone lines and open fire on the guard towers, forcing
          the guards to abandon their positions.  
     3.   Break into the Ukrainians' quarters, seize their weapons and lock
          them up under guard in the barracks.  
     4.   Set the camp afire and destroy it.  
     5.   Arm with additional weapons taken from the SS and the Ukrainians. 
     6.   Link up with the extermination area people.  

     The signal for beginning Stage B was to be a grenade explosion.  The
plan for the extermination area contained the following stages: 
     1.   Prisoners leave the barracks where they were kept in the
          afternoon hours after work.  
     2.   Attack the SS men and Ukrainian guards near the barracks and
          seize their weapons.  
     3.   Prisoners burst into the guard room and seize the guards'
weapons.       4.   Take over the guard tower where a Ukrainian guard armed
with a         machine gun was stationed.  
     5.   Take control of the entire extermination area, destroy it and
          link up with the people of the lower camp for a joint escape.  

Stage C: Organized Departure to the Forests by All Prisoners.  On Sunday,
August 1, in the late hours of the evening, the "organizing committee" in
Camp A held its final meeting.  At the meeting it was decided that the
uprising would definitely take place on the following day.  (Shmuel
Rajzman, "Hitkomemut be-Mahane ha-Hashmada Treblinka," 'Kehillat 
Wengrow--Sefer Zikkaron', 1961, pp.66-68) 

The Insurrection--August 2, 1943 
 
     The final decision on the uprising was conveyed to the other members 
of the underground on the eve of the revolt and in the early hours of the
morning.  The underground members who worked in the workshops prepared
weapons--knives, axes and the like.  Until noon work went on as usual.  In
spite of the secrecy, however, word of the revolt had reached other
prisoners.  The men prepared extra clothing and money and valuables that
would be useful once they were outside the camp. As it happened, on the
afternoon of that same day a group of four SS men and sixteen Ukrainians,
headed by Kurt Franz, left the camp to go bathing in the Bug River, which
was just a few kilometers away.  This coincidence helped weaken the force
guarding the camp.  At 13:00 hours the "camp elder," as usual, inspected
the noon roll-call, after which the men dispersed to their places of work,
but this time with certain changes--the combat groups and commanders went
to work places in accord with the tasks assigned them for the insurrection. 
The mission of the group in the potato storage, which worked near the SS 
headquarters, was to attack the headquarters with grenades.  (Marian
Platkiewicz, "Mered ba-Gehnom -- Parshiyot Zeva'a u-Gevura be-Mahane
ha-Hashmada Treblinka," 'Plock -- Toledot Kehilla Atikat Yomin be-Polin',
Tel Aviv, 1967, p.549.  Testimony of Tajgman, op.cit., p.14; testimony of
Wolf Schneidmann, YVA, 0-3/560, p.4) 

     The leaders of the underground, Galewski, Kurland and others, 
gathered in the square near the lazarett in the southwest section of 
the camp.  Most of the prisoners were in this section, which was also 
close to the extermination area, a fact that was supposed to facilitate
contact with the underground people there. 
 
     The assembly of the prisoners and their organization for escape during
the uprising were also to take place in the southern part of the camp.  A
shortcoming of the concentration of the leaders of the revolt in the
southern part of the camp was their remoteness from the place where the
removal of the arms was carried out and from the attack on the SS and
Ukrainian quarters. 
 
     At 14:00 hours the removal of the arms and their transfer to various 
places got under way.  Sadowicz, a member of the "organizing committee,"
was in charge of this operation.  A group of youngsters, among them Markus
and Salzberg, made their way into the arms store and filled sacks with
grenades, firearms and ammunition.  The sacks were passed out through the
window and loaded on garbage carts.  on which they were taken to the nearby
garage, where two other members of the underground worked--Rudek Lubernicki
and Srenda Lichtblau.From the garage some of the weapons were transferred
in pails and carts of building materials to the assembly points of the
combat groups, especially to the area where the leaders of the revolt were
located.  (Platkiewicz, op.cit., pp. 548-549; Sereny, opt cit., p. 246;
Rajzman, op.cit., p.221; Kon, op.cit., pp.537-538) Up until about 15:30
everything went according to plan, but then the operation was disrupted.  A
SS man called Kurt Kuttner suddenly appeared in the area of the prisoners'
quarters.  After having a short talk with the prisoner in charge of
Barracks Number 2, Kube, who was known to be an informer, Kuttner seized a
young Jew and found money in his pockets.  He began to interrogate the
youth and to beat him.  Word was immediately dispatched to Galewski and his
colleagues, and they, fearing that Kube may have noticed unusual activity
in the camp and had told Kuttner, and fearing that the youth might break
under interrogation and give away the uprising, decided to eliminate 
Kutlner on the spot and proceed directly to the second stage of the revolt,
before Kuttner would be able to alert the camp guards.  This decision was
reached even though part of the arms had not yet been removed from the
storeroom and the rest had not all been distributed.  Committee member
Salzberg conveyed the decision to the underground people who were near the
prisoners' quarters, and one of the men killed Kuttner with a pistol shot. 
That shot was the signal for the outbreak of the insurrection.  (Testimony
of Strawczynski, op.cit., p. 57; testimony of Schneidmann, op.cit., p. 4) 
 
     From that moment the "organizing committee" was no longer in control. 
The groups of fighters acted separately.  Rudek Lubernicki and Stenda 
Lichtblau set fire to the large fuel tank, and when it exploded all the
nearby buildings caught fire.  The two also immobilized an armored vehicle
in the garage.  The prisoners' quarters and the warehouses were also set
aflame, and the group working in the potato silo hurled hand grenades at
the SS quarters.  The explosions and gunshots were heard in all parts of
the camp.  Prisoners began running in the direction of the square and the
eastern and southern fences of the camp.  The Ukrainian guards and SS
opened fire from the guard towers and elsewhere, and some of the insurgents
who were armed returned the fire.  Several Ukrainians were wounded and
their weapons taken from them.  The few grenades and meager ammunition that
the rebels had was running out very quickly.  The camp was going up in
flames and in total disarray, and the prisoners began to break through the
fences and get themselves over the anti-tank obstacles, throwing blankets
and coats on the barbed wire.  Many of those fleeing in the area of the
fences were hurt and fell, but the others trampled over them and continued
to run.  All the members of the "organizing committee," including Galewski,
and other members of the underground who were actively involved in the
revolt, were the last to make for the fences; most of them were hit and
fell within the camp.  (There are several versions concerning the death of
Galewski.  Leon Perelstein, a prisoner who escaped from the camp together
with Galewski, relates that after they had gone a few Kilometers, Galewski
felt that he did not have the strength to go on.  He took some poison out
of his pocket, swallowed it and died on the spot.  See YVA, 0-16/106, p. 5. 
Rachel Auerbach, however, notes that Galewski killed himself after being
surrounded.  See her book, Be-Huzot Varsha 1939-1943, Tel Aviv, 1954, p.
346, note 106.  Also see testimony of Strawczynski, op.cit., pp. 58-59;
Platkiewicz, op.cit., pp. 549-550; Wilenberg, op.cit., pp. 56-58) 
 
          Stangl, the commander of the camp, relates about the outbreak of
     the revolt: Looking out of my window I could see some Jews on the
     other side of the inner fence--they must have jumped down from the
     roof of the ss billets and they were shooting...  In an emergency like
     that my first duty was to inform the chief of the external security
     police.  By the time I'd done that, our petrol station blew up.  That
     too had been built just like a real service station, with flower beds
     round it.  Next thing the whole ghetto camp was burning and then
     Matthes, the German in charge of the Totenlager, arrived at a run and
     said everything was burning up there too...(Sereny, op.cit., pp. 
     239-241) 

The Uprising in the Extermination Area 
 
     The decision to begin the insurrection on August 2 was communicated 
to the extermination area several days before.  On the day of the uprising
itself, around noon, Wiernik arrived in the extermination area and
confirmed that it was definitely decided that the uprising would take place
that very day.  Because of the summer heat, the work hours for cremating
the bodies were from 4:00 A.M.  until noon, after which the prisoners were
kept under guard in their fenced-off and closed barracks.  In the
extermination area there were usually four SS men (three of them operating
the bulldozers) and another seven Ukrainian guards.  However, when the
uprising began only one SS man was there, as the three bulldozer operators
had already finished their work.  In order to enable the members of the
underground to be outside the barracks at the hour set for the revolt,
Bloch and Friedman decided to leave some bodies for burning so that it
would be necessary to continue the work in the afternoon.  Friedman, who
was the head of a work group, informed the SS man in charge of the
cremations that they had not managed to finish the work, and he gave
permission to a group of thirty men--most of them members of the
underground--to go out to work again at 3:00 P.M.  (Testimony of Rosenberg,
op.cit., p.3; testimony of Goldfarb, op.cit.,p.26) Four other members of
the underground were also allowed to be outside the barracks, ostensibly
for drawing water for the kitchen, with a Ukrainian guard close by.  All of
them were tense and ready for the agreed-upon sign to be given from Camp A.

 
     At about 15:30 a shot was heard from the direction of the lower camp, 
immediately followed by the sound of exploding grenades.  The members of
the underground in the extermination area then went into action. The group
of water-drawers killed the Ukrainian guard, and another group killed the
Ukrainian guard who was positioned at the entrance to the living quarters. 
Zelo Bloch took one of the rifles and fired at the guards in the guard
towers.  The insurgents took over the guardroom, taking a number of rifles
from it.  At this stage the insurgents were successful.  While the
underground members were fighting, the other prisoners burst through the
fences that were behind the barracks on the southern side of the camp and
began escaping into the fields in the direction of the forest.  A machine 
gun fired on them from the guard tower in the southeastern corner of the
camp.  Block and Friedman, who stayed behind to cover the escapees with
rifle fire, were killed by the gunfire.  The gas chambers themselves were
not damaged in the exchange of fire that took place in the camp.  (Wiernik,
op.cit., pp.59-60; testimony of Rosenberg, op.cit., pp.3,4; Rajgrodski, op. 
cit., pp. 115-116; testimony of Sonia Lewkowicz, YVA,0-3/4181, p.5) 

Escape and Pursuit 
 
On the day of the uprising there were 850 prisoners in the entire camp. 
About half, including most of the members of the underground, were killed
trying to escape, gunned down in the camp itself, between the fences or
near them.  About 100 prisoners decided to remain in the camp and made no
attempt to escape.  Despite the heavy gunfire, about half of those who
tried to escape did manage to get over the fences.  In order to reach the
forest they had to cross a distance of 5-8 kilometers.  In the meantime
Stangl the camp commander, alerted the German security forces by telephone
(because of the disruptions in the plan the insurgents had not had time to
cut the lines).  They arrived from Malkinia, Kosov, the Treblinka labor
camp and elsewhere and cordoned off an area at a radius of 5 kilometers
from the camp. (Sereny, op.cit., p.247; Rajgrodski, op.cit., p.116) 

     The pursuit, the combing of the area and the roadblocks resulted in 
the capture of most of the escapees, most of whom were shot on the spot. 
The local population was of no help.  Prominent in the testimonies of the
survivors is the assertion that the peasants in the region caught the
escapees, took their money and then handed them over to the Germans. 
(Rajzman, op.cit., p.190; Greenberg, op.cit., pp.63-64; testimony of
Schneidmann, op.cit., pp.4-5; testimony of Tajgman, op.cit., p.20)
Nevertheless, some of the survivors of the escape from Treblinka owe their
lives to the help they received from the local inhabitants.  (Testimony of
Goldfarb, op.cit., p.28) 
 
     There is no way of knowing the exact number of prisoners who
successfully escaped and found places to hide.  According to various
estimates, about 60-70 of the Treblinka escapees were still alive at
the end of the war.  It may be assumed, however, that a larger number 
escaped during the uprising but that some met their death under various
circumstances in the year between the uprising and the liberation of the
area by the Soviet and Polish armies, or until the liberation of all of
Poland.  Thus, of the 850 prisoners in the camp, it is probable that at
least 100 escaped and successfully eluded the pursuit forces.  This
estimate is higher than the figure generally  accepted until now.  (See,
for example: The Death Camp Treblinka--A Documentary, Alexander Donat, ed.,
New York, 1979.  A list of sixty-nine survivors is given in this work, but
it contains mistakes and duplications.  Testimonies of twenty-seven of the
survivors are in my possession.)
 
************************************************************************
CAMPS - 4


                       THE NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS 
 
   Structure and Aims * The Image of the Prisoner The Jews in the Camps 
 
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH YAD VASHEM INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL CONFERENCE 
                         Jerusalem, January 1980 
                                YAD VASHEM 
                              JERUSALEM 1984 
 
                             SEVENTH SESSION 
                           Chairman: Bela Vago 
 
JEWISH PRISONER UPRISINGS IN THE TREBLINKA AND SOBIBOR EXTERMINATION CAMPS 
 
YITZHAK ARAD 
 
Liquidation of the Camp 
 
     After the uprising, on August 18 and 19, 1943, another two transports
slated for extermination arrived in Treblinka, bringing Jews from
Bialystok.  Shortly afterward the Germans destroyed the gas chambers and
the other installations that remained after the revolt, and with that put
an end to the camp.  While the liquidation of the camp was no doubt in
accord with a plan that predated the uprising, its timing was probably
moved up in wake of the revolt.  On October 20 most of the remaining Jewish
prisoners were transferred to Sobibor, where they were killed.  Another
25-30 prisoners remained in Treblinka and were shot there a few days later. 
In order to cover up the crime, a farm-house was built on the site of the
camp, trees were planted, and a Ukrainian peasant was employed to guard the
deserted place. (Sereny, op.cit., pp.249-250; Franciszck Zabecki, 'Rozbicie
obozu w Treblince', Warsaw, 1977, pp.94-95) 

The Treblinka Revolt in Polish Sources 
 
     The idea of the uprising, its organization and implementation were 
entirely the fruit of prisoner initiative.  No assistance nor encouragement
whatsoever was received from the outside.  In a number of Polish sources,
which appeared for the first time in 1969, mention is made of a plan by the
Armia Krajowa (Fatherland Army) to attack Treblinka and free its prisoners. 
According to what is written, this was in coordination with the Jewish
underground in the camp.  It is also stated in these publications that on
August 2 the camp was in fact attacked from the outside.  (Ibid., pp. 
96-99; Tedyslaw Razmowski, "Akcja Treblinki," 'Dzieje Najnowsze', Vol.  I,
1969, pp. 167-172) It should, however, be noted that these accounts are
filled with imprecisions, contradictions and a lack of clarity and confused
information about the labor and penal camp--Treblinka 1, where most of the
prisoners were Poles--and about the Treblinka annihilation camp.  It is
more reasonable to suppose that the Armia Krajowa's planned attack had to
do with Treblinka 1.  In not a single testimony by survivors of Treblinka
is there any mention of a link with the Polish underground or with any
other underground outside the camp, or any hint whatever of assistance
received from outside.  Nor is Polish assistance in the revolt mentioned in
the reports of the Polish underground written during the war and dealing
with the Jews' uprising in Treblinka.  The same holds for the German
sources, and for the two Treblinka trials, where no Polish attack on
Treblinka is mentioned.  It is certain that had such an attack occurred it
would have aroused responses on a wide front, including reprisal measures, 
and would have appeared in the German reports.  It thus can be stated with
absolute certainty that the Polish underground did not extend any aid
whatever to the revolt in Treblinka.  The Polish underground did not attack
German camps in which Polish prisoners were held in detention, even though
those Poles were themselves members of the underground.  Moreover, it is
known that the Armia Krajowa was not distinguished by its sympathy for the
Jews, and it is difficult to suppose that its forces would have carried out
an offensive operation against a camp within which, with the exception of
some 2,000 Gypsies, only Jews were imprisoned and annihilated. 
Furthermore, survivors of Treblinka tell of many instances in which Armia
Krajowa people conspired against them after their escape from the camp. 
(For testimonies of escapees from the camp who were given a hostile 
reception by the surrounding population, see Abram Krzepicki, "Relacje
dwoch zbiegow z Treblinki II," BZIH, No.  40, 1961, pp. 78-88.  Sereny, op. 
cit., pp.244-245; testimony of Goldfarb, op.cit., pp.28-29) 

Influence of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising on the Treblinka Uprising 
 
     The idea of an uprising and the formation of the underground in 
Treblinka occurred before the Warsaw ghetto uprising.  In the testimonies
of Treblinka survivors, we find conflicting views on the effect information
about the Warsaw ghetto uprising and its outcome had on the prisoners and
members of the underground in Treblinka.  On the one hand is the claim that
word of the Jewish fighting lifted morale and fostered a fighting spirit in
Treblinka.  On the other hand, the view has been put forward that the
remnants of Warsaw Jewry who were brought to Treblinka had given up on the
possibility of rescue by means of revolt or escape; this discouraged the
prisoners in Treblinka and cast a cloud of pessimism over the camp.
(Wilenberg, op.cit., pp.52-53; Kon, op.cit., p.536; testimony of
Strawczynski, op.cit., p.50) C.  Acts of Resistance and the Organization of
the Revolt in Sobibor The effort to preserve the secrecy of the Sobibor
annihilation camp was more successful than for other annihilation camps,
including Belzec (from which only one man managed to escape).  The security
arrangements in Sobibor were very tight and severe from the earliest
stages, and the number of those who escaped en route to the camp and from
the camp itself was small compared to Treblinka.  In the first period of
the camp's operation--May to July 1942--approximately 100,000 Jews were
murdered in Sobibor.  But fewer transports were sent there than to
Treblinka, and the total number of Jews murdered in Sobibor came to about
250,000, whereas in Treblinka the number reached 875,000.  (The figure
quoted here is based on research that will shortly be published in my book
Treblinka--Ovdan ve-Mered, Tel Aviv, 1983) 
 
     The relatively smaller number of transports enabled better security 
of the camp area and prevention of escapes from it, thereby forestalling
the filtering out of information about what was taking place there.  Rumors
about the existence of the Sobibor extermination camp only reached the
nearest communities, Wlodawa and Chelm.  We have very little information
about escapes from Sobibor, and what there is not based on direct testimony
of escapees nor even on the testimony of people who met the escapees.  We
know, for example, that on Christmas in 1943, five Jewish prisoners (two of
them women), along with two Ukrainian guards, escaped from the
extermination area in Sobibor (called Camp 3).  But a Polish farmer
informed on them and in the pursuit carried out by the "Blue [Polish]
Police" they managed to shoot and kill the two Ukrainians and one of the
women.  As reprisal for the escape, several hundred prisoners were shot to
death in the camp.  (Tatiana Berenstein, "Obozy pracy przymusowej dla Zydow
w Dystrykcie Lubelskirn," BZIH, No. 24, 1957, p.16.  The Blue 
Police --the Polish police force that worked for 
the Germans.) 
 
     In another instance known to us, a prisoner escaped from the main 
camp (called in Sobibor--Camp 1) by hiding in a freight car among piles of
clothing being sent from Sobibor to Gerrnany; he made his way to Chelm.  It
appears that he is the person who spread the word in Chelm about what was
happening in Sobibor.  When the last transport of Jews from Chelm was en
route to Sobibor, toward the end of February 1943, there were indeed a
number of escape attempts (Ilya Ehrenburg, ed., 'Merder fun Felker--
Materyalen vegen di Retsikhes fun di Daytshishe farkhaper in die Tsyvaylik
okupirte sovyetishe raiyonen', Moscow, 1944-1945.  According to the
testimony of Haim Poroznik , the escape
took place in February 1943.) made from the train.  A transport of people
from Wlodawa, which arrived in Sobibor on April 30, 1943, also resisted
when ordered to get off the train at the Sobibor platform.  

     Another such instance occurred on October 11, 1943, when the people
resisted going to the gas chambers and broke out in flight.  Some were
killed near the fences, and the others were caught and brought to the gas 
chambers.  (Alexander Pechorsky, 'Der Oifstand in Sobibor', Moscow, 1946,
pp.40-41.  Ehrenburg, op.cit., p.14; group testimony by survivors of
Sobibor, YVA, 0-3/2352, p.62; Ruckerl, op.cit., p. 168) 
 
     Talk about the possibility of resistance and escape began to circulate
at the end of 1942 or beginning of 1943.  One of the ideas raised was
poisoning the SS people.  (Ibid., p.186.  Adam Rutkowski, "Ruch oporu w
hitlerowskim obozie stracen Sobibor," BZIH, No. 65-66, 1968, pp. 14-15) But
all of this early talk did not lead to concrete results, and for the period
until the middle of 1943 we have no reliable information on organizing for
escape.  In late June 1943, after the liquidation of the camp at Belzec,
the 600 prisoners who still remained in the camp were brought to Sobibor. 
They were told that they were being brought to Germany to work, but when
they arrived at Sobibor they were removed, in groups of ten, and shot on
the spot.  From a note found among the clothing of the murdered, the
Sobibor prisoners learned that those who had been killed were from work
groups in the Belzec camp.  The note said: We worked for a year in Belzec. 
I don't know where they're taking us now.  They say to Germany.  In the
freight cars there are dining tables.  We received bread for three days,
and tins and liquor.  If all this is a lie, then know that death awaits you
too.  Don't trust the Germans.  Avenge our blood !  (There are several
different versions of the exact wording of the note; possibly there was
more than one. Testimony of Leon Feldhendler, 'Dokumenty', Vol.I, 'Obozy',
p. 207) The Sobibor prisoners now understood with greater certainty what
fate awaited them.  The slowed-down tempo of transports at the end of
July--because of the cessation of the transports from Holland-- added to
the feeling that the end was approaching.  All this led to more intensive
organization by the underground and more attempts to escape from the camp. 
A short time after the murder of the people from Belzec, two prisoners cut
the camp fences one night and succeeded in getting away.  On the following
day at the roll-call, twenty arbitrarily selected prisoners were shot to
death in reprisal.  The SS men announced that this method of collective
punishment--for each prisoner to escape ten would be shot--would be used in
reprisal for all instances of escape.  (Testimony of Tomasz (Tuvia) Blat,
YVA, 0-3/713, pp. 69-70; Moshe Bahir, "Ha-Mered ha-Gadol be-Sobibor,"
'Pirsume Museum ha-Lohamim ve-ha-Partizanim', April 1944, p.12). 
 
     Previous to that event, one night in June 1943, the prisoners were 
suddenly taken from their barracks and kept for a number of hours under
heavy guard by the Ukrainians; then shots were heard from the area of the
camp's fences.  On the next day the prisoners learned from the Ukrainians
that Soviet partisans had tried to get near the camp.  (Testimony of Z. 
Ida Matz, Dokumenty, Vol. I, Obozy, p. 213.  It should be noted that in the
various sources concerning partisan activity in the Sobibor area, no
mention is made of any outside attempts to attack the camp.) 
 
     It should be noted that in that same period there were several 
instances of Ukrainian guards fleeing and joining the partisans.  As a
precaution against escape by both prisoners and guards alike, and against
partisan activity in the area around Sobibor (especially east of the Bug),
in July 1943 Wehrmacht soldiers laid a minefield 15 meters wide around the
camp.  In addition, west of Camp 1 a water channel was dug between the
prisoners' barracks and the conifer thicket in the camp.  In direct
response to the escapes by the Ukrainians, the camp commanders decided to
arm only those guards actually doing guard duty, and they were each given
only five bullets.  When they learned of the escapes, the prisoners tried
to establish contact with the partisans via the Ukrainians.  (Rutkowski, 
op.cit., pp.16-17; testimony of Blat, op.elf., pp.69-70) They were
unsuccessful. 
 
     On July 5, 1943, Himmler ordered that Sobibor be converted into a 
concentration camp whose installations would serve as a depot for 
captured Soviet ammunition, which would be reprocessed by the camp's 
prisoners.  According to this order the camp was to be placed under the
concentration-camp administration in the head office of the SS. (Ruckerl,
op.cit., p.176) Following the order construction work for storing the
captured ammunition was begun in the northern part of the camp (called in
Sobibor--Camp 4).  At the same time, a work group that came to be called
the Wald-Kommando ("forest commando"), numbering forty people (half of them
Jews from Poland, and half Jews from Holland), began to work cutting down
trees in a forest several kilometers from Sobibor.  The wood was needed for
construction of the new installations.  A squad of seven Ukrainians and two
SS men was assigned to guard the work group.  One day two of the prisoners 
(Shlomo Pudhalebnik and Yosef Kurz, both of them from Poland), accompanied
by a Ukrainian guard, were sent to gel water from the nearby village.  on
the way there, the two killed the guard, took his gun and fled.  When the
incident was discovered, work was immediately stopped, and the men of the
Wald-Kommando were taken back to the camp.  Suddenly, at an agreed-upon
signal, the Polish Jews in the group broke out into a general flight.  Ten
of them were caught, some were shot while fleeing, and only eight managed
to get away.  The Dutch Jews in the Wald-Kommando decided not to join in
the escape attempt, fearing that their lack of knowledge of the language
and unfamiliarity with the region would greatly diminish their chances of 
finding refuge.  The ten prisoners who were caught, among them the Capo,
were brought to the camp and were shot in full view of all the prisoners. 
(Testimony of Blat, op.cit., pp.74-75; Matz, op. cit., p.212; testimony of
Abraham Wang, who was one of the members of the forest commando who
succeeded in escaping, YVA, 0-3/4139, pp. 6-7) Underground Organization and
Preparations for Revolt 
 
     From the second half of July until the middle of August 1943, an 
underground group was formed in the camp under the leadership of Leon
Feldhendler, who had been the chairman of the Judenrat in Zolkiew.  The
group was made up mostly of the heads of workshop work groups.  In light of
the method of collective punishment that the Germans instituted and the
presence of a minefield around the camp, the underground group reached the
conclusion that it was necessary to plan a large, organized escape during
the course of which most of the camp's prisoners would flee.  According to
one of the early plans, the boys who worked as servants in the SS living
quarters were to kill the SS while they slept, take their weapons and hand
them over to the members of the underground.  According to this plan, after
the killing, of the Germans the Ukrainian guards were supposed to join 
the insurgents and escape with them to the forest and the partisans. This
plan, however, was quickly shelved because it was feared that the boys,
aged 14-16, would not be up to the task, and because the plan would have to
be carried out in the early morning hours and that would give the Germans a
full day for pursuit.  (Testimony of Feldhendler's wife, YVA, 0-16/464;
Rutkowski, op.cit., p.16; testimony of Blat. op.cit., p. 77; Matz, op.cit.,
p. 213) 
 
     Another plan proposed in August spoke of setting the camp on fire 
in the afternoon hours (or, according to another version, in the middle 
of the night), and, in the ensuing commotion, when the SS and Ukrainians
would be called to extinguish the fire, the prisoners would burst through
the gates and flee.  But when word of this plan was conveyed to other
groups of prisoners, they rejected it. (Testimony of Feldhendleis wife, op. 
cit., p.  13; Rutkowski, op. cit., p. 15; Matz, op.cit., p. 213; testimony
of Dov Freiberg, The Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v.  Adolf
Eichmann, Minutes of Session No. 64, Jerusalem, 1961 ) 
 
     Another plan proposed digging a tunnel, but nothing came of it.  One 
of the major shortcomings of the underground group was the absence of 
someone with leadership ability and military training who would be able to
work out a complex escape plan.  Finally Feldhendler found a suitable
person: a Dutch Jew named Joseph Jacobs, a former naval officer, who had
been brought to Sobibor on May 21, 1943.  (The exact name of the Dutch Jew
is not certain, and there is no proof that his name was, in fact, Jacobs. 
According to another version, he was a journalist and fought in the
International Brigade in Spain: Louis de Jong, 'Het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden--In de Tweede wereldoortog', Vol.  VIII--'Gevangenen en
Gedeporteerden', The Hague, 1918, p. 818.) 
 
     Jacobs took it upon himself to organize the uprising together with his

Dutch friends, in conjunction with the underground group.  According to the
new plan that was formulated, the insurgents, assisted by several Ukrainian
guards who had agreed to collaborate, would steal into the arms shed in the
afternoon, when the SS people were in the dining hall.  The insurgents
would arm themselves, burst through the main gate and escape to the
forests.  However, one of the Ukrainians informed, and the escape plan
became known.  Jacobs was seized and Interrogated about his partners in the
plot.  In spite of continued blows and torture Jacobs did not break and
adhered to his claim that he alone planned to escape.  Still, in reprisal
for the escape attempt, seventy-two Dutch Jews were murdered along with
him. (Testimony of Feldhendler's wife, op.cit., pp. 11-12; Rutkowski, 
op.cit., p. 22 (according to Rutkowski, it is possible that the escape took
place in July and not in August.); testimony of Freiberg, Eichmann's Trial,
op.cit.) 
 
     Another escape was planned in the first half of September 1943 by six 
Capos, headed by the Oberkapo Moshe Sturm.  But one of the prisoners, 
called Berliner, informed, and the six were caught and shot in full view of
all the prisoners.  As a reward the Germans appointed Berliner Oberkapo,
but shortly afterward the prisoners also "rewarded" him, and Berliner was
poisoned.  (In the camp, Moshe Sturm was called "Moshe the Governor." On
this, see Blat, op.cit., pp. 71-72; Rutkowski, op.cit., p. 21; testimony of
Izak Rotenberg, YVA, 0-3/4141, p. 3.  According to Bahir, op.cit., p. 12, a
Capo by the name of Positzka was involved in Berliner's poisoning.) 

     Another escape attempt was made in mid-September.  Prisoners kept in 
the extermination area (Camp 3) dug a tunnel that began in their barracks
and was supposed to reach beyond the fences and the minefield.  The work of
burrowing the tunnel was almost finished when it was discovered by the camp
guards.  The prisoners of Camp 3, who then numbered between 100 and 150
men, were shot as punishment.  When the Camp 3 prisoners were being taken
to be executed, the prisoners in the other part of the camp were kept in
roll-call formation under heavy guard as a preventive measure.  Afterward,
a new group of men was transferred to Camp 3.  (Testimony of Blat, op. 
cit., p.76. Testimony of Jacob Biskowitz, Eichmann's Trial; Matz, op. 
cit., p. 213; Rutkowski, op.cit., p.16.) 
 
     In spite of the repeated failures in organizing an escape and in 
spite of the heavy collective punishments--the killing of hundreds of 
prisoners in the camp, which caused terrible damage to the self-confidence
of the organizers--the underground group headed by Feldhendler continued
its tireless search for a new person able to lead the revolt and escape. 
This leader was now found in the person of a Jewish officer, a former
lieutenant in the Soviet army, named Alexander Pechorsky.  Pechorsky
arrived at the camp with a group of 100 Jewish war prisoners who had served
in the Red Army and had been kept at the SS labor camp in Minsk.  When the
Minsk ghetto was liquidated, this group.  together with a large transport
of 2,000 Jews, was brought to Sobibor.  Most of the Minsk Jews were sent 
directly to the gas chambers, save for a group of eighty men--most of them
skilled workers or prisoners of war--who were kept in the camp in order to
work on the construction of Camp 4 in place of the group of Dutch Jews who
had been murdered and the prisoners of Camp 1 who had been transferred to
the extermination area. 
 
     The arrival of the prisoners of war, a cohesive group with battle 
experience and bearing the glory of the Soviet army, lifted the morale of
the Sobibor prisoners.  The outstanding leader of this group was Lieutenant
Pechorsky.  Contact between him and Feldhendler was established by Shlomo
Litman, a Polish Jew and carpenter by trade who had been in the SS camp at
Minsk together with the Soviet prisoners and had arrived with them at
Sobibor.  Feldhendler was impressed by Pechorsky's personality, and at
their first meeting, which took place on the evening of October 29, already
suggested to him that he organize a mass escape from the camp.  In
subsequent talks conducted between the two, a group was established;
Pechorsky at its head and Feldhendler as his deputy.  The other members of
the group were four people from Feldendler's group and three from the Minsk
group.  (The members of the Feldhendler group were the heads of the various
groups of artisans: Janek headed the carpenters; Josef, the tailors; Jacob,
the cobblers, and Munik, the youth group. Members of the Minsk group were
Lipman, Tziebulski and Shubayev.  See Pechorsky, op.  cit., pp.  26-27,
41.) The cooperation between the two groups, with Feldhendler's group
contributing their experience in the camp and familiarity with its
conditions and Pechorsky's people contributing military know-how and
experience, led to the formulation of two plans that were supposed to make
possible the escape of all 600 prisoners from the camp, including the 150
women in Camp 1.  (In the Sobibor Camp there were also Jewish women
prisoners.  The first group was brought to the camp as soon as it was
established to work in the kitchen for the SS personnel.  Later, when it
was decided to keep a permanent group of prisoners in the camp, women were
included among them.  They were working in the kitchen, laundry and in
other services and were lodged next to the blocks of the Jewish male 
prisoners.) 
 
     The prisoners in the extermination area, who at that time numbered a
few dozen, were not informed of the plans, because of the inability to
establish contact with them.  In light of the lessons of the past and in
order to prevent treason it was decided this time not to bring the
Ukrainians in on the plan.  The first plan worked out by the new leadership
was based on digging a tunnel 35 meters long from the carpentry shed, which
was located near the camp fence, to a point beyond the fences and the
minefield.  According to the plan all the prisoners in the camp were to
escape, at night, through the tunnel.  Pechorsky was well aware that
digging a tunnel was a complicated matter that would take two or three
weeks, and even if the work were completed, the attempt to get 600 people
out on one night might well fail.  He also was told of the discovery of the
tunnel in Camp 3, and therefore an alternate plan was also worked out.  It
involved killing the SS people, seizing their arms, and escaping in an
organized flight.  And so along with the work of burrowing the tunnel,
which began on October 5 (Valentin Tomin and A.  Sinelnikov, Vozvrash.henie
me..helatelno, Moscow, 1964.) and was carried out only at night,
preparations were begun for the alternative plan. 
 
     Two of the Capos--Positzka and Czepik--who sensed that secret work 
was going on, realized that there was an underground organization and that
plans for an escape were being made.  They asked Pechorsky to allow them to
join the underground.  Their request was granted, for it was clear how much
the Capos could help in the preparations for the revolt.  And, indeed, on
October 8, with Positzka's assistance, two of the leaders of the
underground, Pechorsky and Litman, were transferred to work in the
carpentry shop, whose location enabled them to supervise the preparations
for the revolt.  (Pechorsky, op.cit., pp.31-32; Rutkowski, op cit., p.31.) 
 
     On October 8 and 9 heavy rains fell on the camp.  The streaming 
water penetrated the tunnel and utterly wrecked it.  It was clear that the
tunnel escape plan had to be abandoned.  At this stage eight of the 
prisoners of war decided to escape from the camp.  Pechorsky learned of
their plan and managed to talk them out of it by stressing the heavy
punishment that would be meted out to the other prisoners in reprisal for
their escape.  (Pechorsky, op.cit., pp.32-34.) Now the only remaining plan
was the alternate plan; it was very complicated and required precise
planning, and the prisoners had very little time left.  October 13 was set
as a possible date for the outbreak of the revolt, for according to the
information that the prisoners had, a group of SS men, among them two of
the most dangerous-- Wagner and Gomerski--would then be on homeland leave
in Germany.  On October 10, the eve of Yom Kippur, the camp authorities
allowed the prisoners to assemble in the women's barracks.  The underground
leadership used this opportunity to confer, and it was decided to begin the
armed uprising very soon.  (Tomin-Sinelnikov, op.cit.,pp.153-155; Ruckerl,
op.cit.,pp.195.) 
 
     On October 12, at 21:00 hours, the leadership of the underground met 
in the carpentry shed.  Ten people took part in this meeting.  (The ten
included Capo Positzka.  On that day, eighteen sick prisoners were taken to
Camp 3 (death camp), and this seriously affected the morale of the other
prisoners.  Pechorsky, op.cit., p.43; testimony of Blat, op.cit.,p.78.)
Pechorsky presented the plan of the revolt that was to take place the
following day.  The plan was divided into three stages.  

Stage A: Between 15:30 and 16:45 
 
     The quiet liquidation of some of the SS men who would be asked to 
come, each separately, to the workshops for clothing or shoe measurements,
for inspecting carpentry work, etc.  Feldhendler was put in charge of
asking the SS men to the workshops.  At the same time, the rest of the SS
people would be killed inside the buildings at the various places of work. 
These activities would be carried out in utmost secrecy in order that they
not be discovered by the other prisoners or the Ukrainian guards.  This
operation was assigned to special groups of two or three men each,
comprised of prisoners of war and long-time prisoners.  

     Each group had its own special task.  Two other men were assigned to 
cut the telephone line that ran from the camp's headquarters, across 
Camp 2, to the security forces in Wlodawa, and to cut off the electricity
in the camp.  Another group was to sabotage the camp vehicles.  The boys
and young girls who worked in the SS living quarters were given the job of
removing the ammunition and grenades they found there and delivering them
to the insurgents.  It was also decided to try to break in secretly to the
Ukrainians' guard room and remove rifles from there.  Positzka was supposed
to take a group from Camp 1 to Camp 2 (the central part of Sobibor was
called Camp 2), where the housing of some of the SS people was located, to
help eliminate the four SS men who were there. 
 
     The time for the outbreak of the revolt was fixed on the assumption 
that the separate elimination of the SS people could only take place 
during work hours.  Also, the hour had to be close to nightfall, in 
order to facilitate escape.  

Stage B: 16:45 
 
     The Capos Positzka and Czepik would get the prisoners into roll-call
formation in the center of Camp 1, as was done every day.  The prisoners of
war and the underground people were to occupy the front rows and then the
Capos would lead the men toward the exit gate.  On the way to the gate the
insurgents would seize the arms shed.  When the Ukrainian guards would
become aware of what was happening and open fire, the insurgents would
return fire, and the quiet operation would turn into an armed revolt.  The
insurgents would break open the gate and break through the southern fence,
near the SS quarters, on the assumption that mines were not laid in that
area.  

Stage C 
 
Escape to the forests and joining up with the partisans.  This stage was
not worked out in any detail, and each of the escapees would have to find
his own way to refuge.  (Pechorsky, op.cit., p.43; Rutkowski, op.cit.,
pp.31-32.) About forty prisoners and POWs were privy to the secret of the
revolt. 
 
     October 13, the day set for the uprising, arrived.  But on that day an
unexpected German inspection committee arrived at the camp, and the heads
of the underground therefore decided to postpone the revolt.  That evening
another meeting was held at which it was decided to carry out the plan the
following day.  The implements that would serve as weapons--knives, axes,
specially sharpened shovels and other tools--were distributed to the
members of the underground. (Testimony of Blat op.cit., p.78; Rutkowski,
op.cit., pp. 30-31; Abraham Margolis, "Mi-Varsha le-Sobibor,"
'Sobibor--Mahane ha-Avadon ve-ha- Mered, Tel Aviv, 1979, p.72 ) 


The Revolt - October 14, 1943 
 
     Up until the hour that had been set for the outbreak of the revolt, 
life in the camp continued as usual.  Except for the underground members,
the vast majority of the prisoners in the camp did not know what was about
to happen.  The first stage of the revolt was also carried out as planned:
between 16:00 and 16:30 hours, eleven SS men who had been called to the
workshops were killed, among them the commander of the camp,
Untersturmfu"hrer Niemann.  These were all the SS people in the camp that
day, save for one--Frantzel--who was called to the workshops but did not
come.  The operation in Camp 1 was run by Pechorsky, while Feldhendler
commanded the operation in Camp 2.  The telephone and electric lines were
cut, and the motor vehicles immobilized.  The blacksmiths' group removed
six rifles from the Ukrainian guard room, and these were handed over to the
underground.  (Pechowsky, op.cit., p.54; testimony of Blat, op.cit., p.81;
Rutkowski, p.35; Stanislaw Shmeizner, "Me-Opole le-Sobibor," Sobibor,
op.cit., p.65.) All of these activities were carried out without the
Ukrainians at their posts or in the guard towers being aware of what was
happening. 
 
     At 16:45 Positzka and Czepik began assembling all the prisoners into
roll-call formation.  At that point the rest of the prisoners sensed that
something was afoot, but they still did not know what. According to the
plan, the prisoners of war and the members of the underground, some of them
armed, took up position in the front rows. The operation plan was now
disrupted.  A truck that had arrived from outside the camp appeared in Camp
2 and came to a halt near the building of the camp headquarters.  The
driver, Oberscharfu"hrer Bauer, spotted a dead SS man lying there and then
saw a prisoner running from the building.  He immediately opened fire on
him. (Testimony of Biskowitz, Eichmann's Trial.) At the same time the
commander of the Ukrainian guard, a Volksdeutsche from the Volga area,
appeared at the roll-call square.  The insurgents attacked him and killed
him with ax blows.  The rest of the prisoners became panic-stricken.  The
Ukrainian guards, who now realized what was happening, opened fire.  At
that point Pechorsky decided not to wait until all the prisoners were
assembled, as planned, and instead began stage two of the revolt.  With
cries of Come on!  Hurrah!  the insurgents broke toward the gate and the
fences, and from that moment on there was no control over what happened. 
Some of the insurgents broke open the main gate and escaped from there
southwest toward the woods.  Another group broke through the fences north
of the gate. The first of this group triggered the mines, were wounded and
killed, but the others who crossed the area where the mines had already 
exploded, managed to flee, as they stepped over the bodies of their 
comrades. 
 
     The planned takeover of the arms store was not carried out, but the
insurgents did succeed in killing the guard and taking his rifle. Those who
were armed with rifles opened fire on the Ukrainians and killed four of
them.  The only SS men remaining in the camp, Bauer and Frantzel, and the
other Ukrainian guards returned fire.  Another group of insurgents, headed
by Pechorsky, broke through the fences near the SS living quarters, where,
as they had correctly assumed, mines had not been laid.  Other prisoners
who were still in the area of Camp 2 now fled toward Camp 4.  (Ibid.;
Pechorsky, op.cit., p. 56; Jacob Biskowitz, 'Mi-Hrubieszow le-Sobibor,"
Sobibor, op.cit., p.110; testimony of Goldfarb, op.cit., p.26.) 
 
     Of the 600 prisoners who were in the camp on the day of the uprising,
300 managed to escape.  About 150 were killed by the guards' gunfire or by
the mine explosions.  Approximately 150 sick prisoners and those from
Western Europe and Germany, who had not been let in on the preparations for
the revolt, and those who did not manage to escape, remained in the camp
area.  Some of them got hold of weapons and continued to fight until they
were killed.  Some of those who were caught on camp grounds were shot that
very same day.  The others, including the prisoners in Camp 3 (the area of
the gas chambers) who had taken no part in the uprising, were shot on the 
following day when the chief of staff of Operation Reinhard, Hermann 
Hofle, arrived in the camp from Lublin.  (Rutkowski, op.cit., pp. 42-43;
Ruckerl, op.cit., pp.196 197.) 

The Escape to the Forests and the Pursuit 
 
     Word of the revolt of the Jewish prisoners in Sobibor, which reached 
Chelmno and Lublin after some delay because of the cut telephone lines,
caused a good deal of panic at German headquarters.  According to the
report a revolt had broken out in Sobibor during which the Jewish prisoners
had killed almost all of the SS, had seized the arms store, and, as a
result, all of the security people still in the camp were in danger.  The
report also stated that 300 prisoners had fled in the direction of the Bug
River, and there was the danger that they might link up with the partisans. 
The few SS remaining in the camp were in shock, and some of the Ukrainian
guards had exploited the commotion to flee from the camp.  (Testimony of
Liskowitz, Eichmann's Trial.) 
 
     Following the alarm that same night a large pursuit force was sent to 
the camp.  The force consisted of a company of mounted police, a company of
Wehrmacht soldiers, police and SS forces from Wlodawa and Lublin and about
120 Ukrainians from Sobibor.  It numbered some 400 men.  The search itself
began only at dawn.  In addition, two or three surveillance planes were
employed to follow the escapees in the fields and forests.  The uprising on
the grounds of the camp itself was quickly put down.  But the search in the
surrounding area under the command of Hauptsturmfu"hrer Wilbrandt, which
was to prevent the escapees from joining the partisans on the other side of
the Bug and to prevent them from spreading the word about the mass
exterminations in Sobibor, lasted for more than a week.  After that time
only the company of mounted police continued to comb the area. 
 
     The escapees had split into a number of groups. (One of them,
headed by Pechorsky and numbering a few dozen fugitives, assembled in the
forest.  They had four pistols and a rifle.  At night they met up with
another group and together numbered about seventy-five men. (Pechorsky, op. 
cit., pp.59-60; testimony of Blat, op.cit., pp. 82-83.) On October 15, the
day after the escape, the men in the group hid in a small wood near the
railroad track.  The German surveillance planes that circled overhead did
not notice anything.  In the evening the group continued north, but on the
way encountered two other escapees who reported that the Bug River
crossings were heavily guarded by the Germans.  Under these circumstances
Pechorsky decided that a group that large had no chance of eluding the
pursuit force. He argued that they must break up into smaller groups, each
of which would try to get past the Germans on its own.  He himself chose 
another eight men from among the prisoners of war and set out.  This 
created some opposition on the part of the other fugitives, who feared
being left without leadership, but, as they had no choice in the matter,
they, too, broke up into small groups that tried to get through the danger
area.  (A particularly striking accusation raised against Pechorsky is that
of Blat who claims that Pechorsky chose all the men equipped with arms, and
that only one of them, Shlomo Shmeizner, remained with the others.  Blat
also claims that Pechorsky told the men that he was going to investigate
the area and would then return, and it was only after it became clear that
he was not coming back that the rest of the escapees decided to split up
into small groups and try to find their way alone.  Testimony of Blat,
op.cit., pp.83-86.  It must be emphasized, however, that Pechorsky's basic 
concept was justified and that partisans always used this method when
facing large enemy forces.  See description of events in the forest in
Pechorsky, op.cit., p.62.) 
 
     Pechorsky and his men managed to get across the Bug on the night of 
October 19.  Three days later they met Soviet partisans from the Brest
region and joined up with them.  (ibid, p.69.) Other groups of escaped
prisoners also managed to link up with Soviet partisan units. 
 
     Feldhendler, together with another dozen or so escaped prisoners, 
hid in the forest for a number of weeks.  He himself found shelter for 
two months at a Polish friend's in his town of Zolkiew.  Later he. 
too, joined the partisans.  (Testimony of Feldhendler's wife, op.cit.,
pp.21-22.) 
 
     Other groups of escapees who roamed in the Parczew forest northwest of
Sobibor encountered, after several weeks of searching.  Polish partisans of
the Armia Ludowa (People's Army) and a group of Ychiel Grynspan's Jewish
partisan unit.  An instance is also known in which six fugitives from
Sobibor were murdered by a local gang that posed as a partisan unit. 
(Testimony of Goldfarb, op.cit., pp.30-31; testimony of Biskowitz,
Eichmann's Trial; Rutkowski, op.cit., pp. 45,46.) 
 
     In the week following the escape, 100 of the 300 escapees were
captured or shot to death.  (Rutkowski, op.ail., p.43.) It was a great
achievement on the part of the insurgents that 200 of them did manage to
get away.  several factors contributed to their success. The searches,
which began only in the morning hours, allowed enough time for many of the
prisoners to slip away from the camp area.  The many woods in the region
also hampered the searches, even from the planes.  Furthermore, the Germans
were mistaken in supposing that most of the escaped prisoners would head
east to the Bug and therefore in stationing most of their forces at the Bug
crossing points.  In fact, most of the fugitives, especially the Polish
Jews, headed north to the Parczew forest. 
 
     The attitude of the local population to the escapees was not uniform.
Some have told of the assistance they received from the local population,
whereas others stress a hostile attitude and instances of farmers trying to
rob or kill the fugitives.  There were also instances in which they
succeeded.  (Testimony of Blat, op.cit.,pp.94, 97-98, 107-108) 
 
     However, despite the relative success, the vast majority of the
escaped prisoners did not live to witness the day of liberation. Some were
caught and killed at later stages of the escape, and others died as
fighters in the ranks of the partisans.  It is estimated that from all the
escapees from Sobibor, only about fifty survived until the day of
liberation.  Some of them, however, including Feldhendler, were killed
_after the liberation_, on April 2, by right-wing Poles. (On Feldhendler's
death, see Nathan Eck, "Sho'at ha-Am ha-Yehudi be-Eropa," Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, 1976, p.255.  We have in our possession thirty-seven recorded
testimonies of which thirty appear in "Sobibor," op.cit.  Another six
survivors, apart from Pechorsky, now live in the Soviet Union, and there
are reports of additional prisoners who survived (two at present live in
Holland).  It may therefore be assumed that the number of survivors was as
least fifty.) 
 
     Three days after the outbreak of the revolt, on October 20, 1943, the 
last Jews of Treblinka were brought to the camp for extermination. 
Afterward the camp was liquidated, its buildings dismantled, and on 
its ploughed-up soil trees were planted. 
 
     The Sobibor revolt and the fear of similar revolts apparently 
influenced Himmler in his decision to order Friedrich Kru"ger, the supreme
commander of the SS and police in the General-Government, to hasten the
elimination of all the Jews still remaining in camps in the Lublin
district.  In an operation the Germans called 'Erntefest' ("harvest
holiday"), at the beginning of November 1943, 42,000 Jews in the Majdanek,
Trawniki and Poniatowa camps were killed. (According to various reports in
our possession, 15,000 Jews were murdered in Poniatowa, 10,000 in Trawniki,
and the rest in Majdanek. See Nachmann Blumental and Joseph Kermish, eds.,
'Ha-Meri ve-ha-Mered be-Getto Varsha - Sefer Mismachim,' Jerusalem, 1965,
pp.451-453.) 
 
     Although the uprisings in Treblinka and Sobibor did not take place 
according to plan, in the end they were successful.  Many scores of 
prisoners did escape, and some of them did survive.  By their act of 
revolt, they not only wrote an important page in the history of Jewish
fighting during World War II, but also succeeded in bringing to the world,
during the days of the war itself, the terrifying truth of what had been
done in the extermination camps.  They have also furnished detailed
_first-hand_ accounts of these two camps and have thus contributed to the
history of the Holocaust period.
 
YITZHAK ARAD