Overbreadth is shorthand for the overbreadth doctrine, which provides that a regulation of speech can sweep too broadly and prohibit protected as well as nonprotected speech. A regulation of speech is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression. Overbreadth is closely related to its constitutional cousin, vagueness. A regulation of speech is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person cannot distinguish between permissible and impermissible speech because of the difficulty encountered in assigning meaning to language.

At least three motives drive the government’s impulse to fashion overbroad regulations. First, officials may employ overbroad regulations to suppress a broad range of criticisms directed against those in power. Second, officials may selectively enforce broad regulations to protect or suppress communicative content as they choose. Third, governments may adopt broad regulations to avoid judicial determinations of content or viewpoint discrimination. Judicial examination of free speech regulations reflects an enduring concern: that free expression needs “breathing space” to survive (City of Houston v. Hill [1987]).

The Supreme Court implicitly recognized overbreadth in two 1940 decisions. In Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), the Court overturned the application of a wholesale ban on labor picketing that outlawed “peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest” and violent actions alike. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the Court held that a “breach of the peace” statute could not be broadly construed to “suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions.” However, in both cases the Court refrained from invalidating the statute in question, calling instead for a limiting construction of its applications.

One of the essential characteristics of contemporary overbreadth doctrine that the Court emphasized in Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) is that it is “manifestly strong medicine,” to be employed “sparingly and only as a last resort,” and not in situations in which “a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.”

A second characteristic of the doctrine is that a regulation’s overbreadth “must be not only real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” This determination entails balancing the potential harm to society when unprotected speech goes unpunished against the societal implications of silencing communicators. As the Court ruled in Gooding v.Wilson (1972), these implications include leaving grievances to fester and foisting the “chilling effects” of regulation upon those whose speech is protected by the Constitution.

Precisely because of these chilling effects, the overbreadth doctrine permits those to whom the law constitutionally may be applied to argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to others. This doctrine constitutes an exception to the traditional third-party standing rule. However, in a series of recent cases, including Hill v. Colorado (2000), the Supreme Court implied that only parties whose speech is unprotected may facially challenge regulations on overbreadth grounds, a development that would alter the historical development of overbreadth doctrine.

The overbreadth doctrine remains a chief tool of constitutional litigators in First Amendment cases.  The U.S. Supreme Court continues to invalidate laws based on the overbreadth doctrine.  For example, the Court invalidated a law that criminalized lying about earning military honors, called the Stolen Valor Act, in United States v. Alvarez (2012).  Similarly, the Court struck down a federal law that criminalized the dissemination of materials depicting animal cruelty in United States v. Stevens (2010).   The Court reasoned the law was overbroad, because it could be applied to hunting videos. 

Send Feedback on this article