

Political Corruption in Latin America: A Research Note

Abstract

This research note looks at recent efforts to measure political corruption by international, regional and national organizations, and examines data for the countries of Latin America. Discussion centers on the methodological challenges and problems, the different types of indicators of corruption, and the regional patterns. The research note compares the levels of corruption among the countries of the region, and addresses the issue of change. Rooted in the historic lack of attention to corruption in the region, data are presented and examined in an effort to spur research into this neglected area.

Introduction

Despite its prominence, corruption has received limited scholarly attention over the years, especially in Latin America. A simple search of the flagship *Latin American Research Review*, for instance, uncovers only one title containing the term (Smallman 1997), and of the 130 reprinted articles and original chapters in the three tomes of the classic reader on political corruption by Arnold J. Heidenheimer and associates (1970, 1989, 2002), only two deal with Latin America (both by Laurence Whitehead 1989, 2002) compared to 14 on Asia and 12 on Africa.¹ Chief among the obstacles to corruption research everywhere has been the absence of data (cumulative, systematic “evidence”).² But since the mid-nineties, a number of international organizations have developed cross-national indexes of corruption based on scores of polls and surveys. Even regional and national polls detailing corruption in Latin America have become available in recent years. Though few empirical studies focusing on Latin America have emerged, the data

¹ The 4 volume set of previously published pieces on corruption compiled by Robert Williams (2000) reveals a similar pattern: 4 on Latin America, 6 on Africa, 13 on Asia, and 15 on Europe and the U.S.

² This has not been the only handicap or reason why the study of corruption has been marginalized in the literature. The study of corruption has long suffered from a lack of clear definition of its subject, the absence of a solid institutional grounding in academia (administrative science, anthropology, economics, political science), the concern that the issue of corruption was overly moralistic, as well as the view that corruption was merely a problem suffered during development and therefore ephemeral. For an almost complete review of the literature see Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) or Williams (2000).

help illustrate and dramatize the extent of and the costs of corruption in the region. One study, for instance, estimates that corruption costs Colombia about 1% of its GDP (Luzzani 2002, 168). Another suggests that Mexicans pay on average 109.5 pesos per household in bribes for a total of more than 23 billion pesos in *mordidas* (Transparencia Mexicana, *Encuesta Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno* 2001).

What do data tell us about corruption in Latin America? How valid and precise are they? How do the countries compare to other regions and to one another? What types of problems does corruption pose in Latin America? Recognizing an absence of regional attention to corruption, this research note lays out and examines data on corruption for the countries of Latin America. I begin by describing the different types of data now available, the sources and the methodological problems, followed by a look at the numbers, the rankings and the trends. I highlight regional and cross-country comparisons, focus on the issue of change, and conclude by setting out the uses (realized and potential) of the data.

Measures of Corruption

Measuring political corruption has long been problematic and despite the proliferation of indexes in recent years, remains so. Problems reach from the normal methodological challenges to the difficulties of agreeing on a definition of corruption itself.³ Some analysts have employed objective measures of corruption based on press reports (e.g. Eker 1981; Morris 1991; Rehen 1997; Whitehad 1983), judicial records

³ Though many use the straightforward definition provided by Nye (1967) – abuse of public office for personal gain -- the literature is full of definitional debate and lack of consensus on what is and what is not corruption. Such lack of conceptual clarity – expressed at times in the notion of levels of corruptness – certainly complicates the use of survey research to measure corruption.

(Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Correa 1985) or information from anticorruption agencies (De Speville 1997; Lopez 1998), but most recognize that the validity of such measures hinge on the credibility and capabilities of the institutions providing the information (the press, the judiciary, or the anti-corruption agency). Hence the sheer nature of corruption paired with wide cross-national differences among these institutions weakens the usefulness of such objective data.

The most recent wave of data on corruption, by contrast, employs subjective measures of corruption recorded through opinion polls. Though obscure surveys of the occurrence of bribery by such groups as Business International date back to 1980, it was not until 1995 when the Berlin-based organization Transparency International (TI) – formed by Peter Eigen, a former World Bank official for East Africa -- began to pull together information from various surveys to calculate what would soon become the most widely-known and used comparative index of corruption worldwide, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Touted as a “poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of business people and country analysts, both resident and non-resident” (*TI Press Release of the 2002 CPI*), TI has compiled its CPI annually since 1995, increasing the scope and coverage of the index every year. Its most recent 2003 CPI draws on 17 different surveys conducted by 13 independent institutions and covering 133 countries. The number of polls contributing to the index for a particular country differs as does the nature of the samples, sample sizes, the time period, and the types of polling questions. For the countries of Latin America, for instance, the 2003 index incorporates results from as many as 12 polls in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela to as few as 3 polls in the case of Cuba. Table 1 sets out the sources, samples, focus, and

coverage of the polls used to gauge corruption in Latin America for 2003. Looking further into the CPI, Appendix Table 1, provides data from the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum: one of the contributing agencies to the CPI . The actual data for the countries of Latin America are presented and discussed in the next section (Table 2).

[Table 1]

Like TI, the World Bank and PriceWaterhouse Coopers also publish international indexes of corruption based on cross-national survey data, but they present these as components of larger national indexes of governance and transparency. The World Bank's Governance Indicators include measures for voice and accountability, political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft/control of corruption for the years 1997-98 and 2000-01 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999, 2002)(see Appendix Table 2). Similar methodologically to the CPI, the World Bank index represents a compilation of responses to surveys of country-experts, business elite and the public conducted by 18 separate business and risk analysts firms, international organizations and think tanks. Like the CPI, the sources used by the World Bank differ in terms of sample size, country coverage and the number and types of questions used. PriceWaterhouse Coopers's (2001) Opacity Index takes a similar approach (see Appendix Table 3). Based on a survey of financial analysts – a survey that is also used in calculating the CPI -- it provides specific measures for the various components of transparency in government that affect capital markets, including (C) corruption, (L) legal system, (E) economic policies, (A) accounting standards, and (R) regulatory regime. It then combines these measures to calculate an Opacity index or O-

factor and even provides a measure of a country's opacity measured as a "tax equivalence."

At the regional level, *Latinobarometro* and Seligson (1997, 1999, 2001, 2002) provide cross-national data on corruption for Latin America. These two regional data sets differ from the global databases in three fundamental ways: first, they both offer more than one simple, aggregate measure or index of corruption, providing instead a variety of indicators relating to distinct aspects of political corruption; second, they include measures of corruption based on a respondent's participation in corrupt exchanges as opposed to mere perceptions regarding the level of corruption in society; and finally, they draw on surveys of opinion from the general public rather than business executives, more specialized staff or country-experts. The much-cited annual regional survey (and much criticized for not being available publicly) *Latinobarometro* covers almost all the countries of the region. Depending on the year of the poll, the *Latinobarometro* has contained six questions related to political corruption: 1) whether corruption has increased or decreased (1995-20003); 2) the extent to which corruption is seen as a serious political problem (1997-2001); 3) direct participation in corruption in terms of paying money illegally to a public employee (2001); 4) direct participation in corruption by the individual or family member (2001, 2002, 2003); 5) the ranking of organizations in terms of the presence of corruption (2001); and 6) the number of civil servants considered to be corrupt (2001) (Table 3, subsequent section) (Lagos 2003). Through a series of studies associated with the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project and with partial funding from USAID, Mitchell Seligson (1999, 2001, 2002) also provides comparable data measuring various dimensions of political

corruption for the countries of Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. Measures include participation rates, victimization rates, and perceptions of the level of corruption among different institutions (police, banking, etc) (Table 4, subsequent section).

Finally, as part of the wave of political attention to corruption, a host of national organizations have conducted national polls on corruption in recent years. National polls generally provide much more complex and nuanced portraits of corruption within a country, facilitating research using individual opinion as the unit of analysis. Seligson (2001), for example, presents detailed information on corruption in Colombia based on telephone surveys in the major cities. Data include measures of participation in corruption in different sectors, how and who initiates the illegal exchange, whether and why the acts get reported to authorities, among other areas. The Mexican chapter of TI -- *Transparencia Mexicana* (TM) – administered an extensive national poll in 2001, the *Encuesta Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno*.⁴ It details the frequency bribes are paid in obtaining 38 different types of public services, the reasons citizens obey (or fail to obey) law, opinions regarding changes in the level of corruption and the institutions expected to fight corruption. The survey also calculates the relative levels of corruption by state and federal entity (Appendix Table 4). A survey by Mexico's ITESM (Tec de Monterrey) also in 2001, in turn, highlights the level and frequencies of corruption, participation rates, and related views among the business community. Similar polls have been conducted in other countries as well. A national poll in Panama known as the

⁴ TM's second *Encuesta Nacional* was conducted in 2003.

“corruptometro” looks at corruption at three time periods between 1996 and 1998, spelling out the public’s perception of corruption, its tolerance of corrupt acts, and the resulting levels of confidence in public and private institutions, among other measures. Surveys in Bolivia in 1998 and 2000 also measure levels of corruption, and like data from other countries, show a high level of concern for this problem (in 1998, over 75% considered the problem of corruption as *“grave”*). Similar surveys have been done in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru.

Intuitively, what better way to determine if corruption exists than asking those who deal with the political system on a daily basis? But survey-based measures of corruption -- now widely used and accepted academically and politically -- are not without their problems (del Castillo 2003). Looking at the three traditional areas of validity, precision and reliability highlights the methodological challenges. Generally, the issue of validity centers on whether the index or indicator truly measures what it is supposed to measure. Three problems emerge. The first centers on a lack of agreement on what polls and the respondents mean by corruption. Does it refer to the level of *“corruptness”* (some acts are considered more corrupt than others)? the frequency of corruption in terms of number of illegal exchanges or perhaps the proportion of overall transactions? or the impact of the act on the economy or society? To the extent that the polls fail to specify what *“it”* is, they allow respondents to fill in the gaps. And to the degree that they do define *“it”*, they tend to emphasize bribery (*“illegal payments”*) over other forms of corruption, and high level corruption over more petty forms of corruption. A second problem relates to the subjective nature of the polls: the tendency in most indexes to measure the respondents *“perception”* of corruption rather than corruption per

se. Not only is perception “not the same thing as corruption itself” (Johnston 2000, 17), but one’s perception of corruption within society may depend on a whole range of factors besides corruption, including past perceptions of corruption or even past measures of corruption as reported by the same agency.⁵ This is critical given the growing publicity of corruption indexes. Yet while measures of a respondents “experience” or involvement in a corrupt act may seek to overcome the dilemma posed by reliance on “perception,” the question remains whether citizens participating in corruption are always aware or even conscious of it. If they are a victim of corruption, then perhaps their recollection is sharper than if they are the beneficiary. Participants of corruption usually have a way of disguising their conduct, even to themselves. Either way, such measures still depend on respondents’ subjective notions of what is and what is not considered corrupt. Finally, questions of validity center on whose subjective assessment is being used and whether all such subjective views should be weighted equally. The global indices, for example, have been criticized for depending overly on elite and business-related opinion, rather than general public opinion, but to what extent will the average citizen have a clear understanding of the degree of corruption? (Johnston 2000).

Generally, precision problems relate to the way opinion is gauged, how the results are presented, and their capacity to detect differences among cases. A major problem with respect to the CPI and other global data indexes center in large part on the fact that they are indexes aggregating or collapsing different types of data into a single measure. Though parsimonious, it is questionable whether such a complex and multidimensional

⁵ In their analysis of perceptions of corruption in Costa Rica, Chile and Mexico using the *Latinobarometro* data, for example, Camp, Coleman and Davis (2000) found the economic situation and interpersonal trust to influence perceptions of corruption. Given the publicity and use surrounding the CPI, it is likely that past CPI measures themselves influence respondents views about the current level of corruption.

phenomenon like corruption can actually be reduced to a single measure and how useful that measure may really be. This is even more problematic given that the polls measure different things: some measure corruption in society, some look at particular agencies or functions of the state, some look at the “problem,” some at the “pervasiveness,” others at the “occurrence” of corruption. The polls and questions also use different scales to determine the level of corruption and fail to incorporate subtle differences across countries as to what “serious” or “high level” might mean to the respondents. Asking respondents to rate the “frequency” that bribes are paid on a scale of 1 to 10, for instance, leaves it to the individual to define “frequency.” Again, this is something the regional and national polls seek to avoid somewhat but even here similar problems remain. Though one poll, for example, asks the frequency of paying a bribe for a particular service during the past 12 months, 6 months, month, week, the poll fails to take into account the fact that some services are used less frequently than others. Most critically, the issue of precision complicates comparing measures across countries and across time. So while most analysts recognize the usefulness of data sets when looking at broad categories of countries (e.g. high, medium, low levels of corruption), the large standard deviations shown say in the CPI scale suggest that care should be taken in interpreting the subtle differences among countries. Indeed, Kaufmann, et al. (1999, 2, 3) of the World Bank note the difficulty of identifying statistically significant differences in governance among countries and thus “warn against taking too seriously the exact point estimates of governance.” A similar problem is the use of the data to detect change across time. As Johnston (2000, 13) argues, it is difficult to use the CPI to look at change over time since it “cannot tell us whether year-on-year differences reflect changes in ‘real’ levels of

corruption, the addition of new data that improve the scale or other methodological difficulties that weaken it.”

A final methodological test relates to reliability. This centers on whether the measures produce consistent results. This is the one area where the various measures of corruption seem to do relatively well, though maybe too well. Studies by Kaufmann et.al (1999) and Lambsdorff (2000, 2002) both find strong pairwise correlations among the various polls used to create the CPI and the World Bank data respectively. This means that while one can question whether the CPI truly measures the level of corruption in the state or society, the contributing polls do seem to be measuring the same thing. A subsequent section looks statistically into this issue. The danger, of course, as alluded to earlier is that past results may actually be influencing future measures.

Survey data is not the only means of gauging the level of corruption for empirical analysis, as noted earlier. But despite national measures, no one has yet compiled systematic cross-national data based on cases of corruption, prosecution patterns or press reports as has been done in corruption research in the U.S. (e.g. Schlesinger and Meier 2002). The El Salvador-based *Probidad* features a “Gallery of the Corrupt” on its web site detailing the many cases and accusations against high-level officials in the region and a review of the most important cases of 2001, but these are neither comprehensive nor systematic. Nonetheless, a cursory review of its 2001 report suggests that the most common types of corruption were irregularities in purchasing and procurement, graft, and bank fraud. Even more informative, the regional organization *Periodistas frente a la corrupción* (PFC), administered by *Probidad*, offers a daily (Monday-Friday) clipping service providing web links to news reports on corruption from more than 50 news

sources throughout the region. Though an excellent source of information for corruption-junkies, the data has yet to be compiled systematically for study.⁶

Corruption in Latin America

Turning to the data, I begin by looking at the international indexes, followed by a brief review of the regional data and a small sample of national data. Figure 1 compares corruption in Latin America to other regions based on the CPI for the years 2000 and 2003. The 2000 measure is taken from Lambsdorff (2000). The 2003 measures include the same countries included in the 2000 study and all countries by region. Recall that the CPI scale is counterintuitive and in fact refers to cleanliness or lack of corruption (10 is low corruption) rather than corruption. As shown, on average Latin America exhibits slightly more corruption than Asia, much more than Western Europe, and somewhat less than Sub-Saharan Africa. The distance separating the developing regions, however, is limited while the ranges (shown below the graph) within each group remain substantial. Even so, as shown in Figure 2 taken from Johnston (1999) with 9 of 11 Latin American countries above the regression line, the countries of Latin America stand out as exhibiting higher levels of corruption than expected based on their levels of human development.

[Figures 1, 2]

According to the CPI, the countries of Latin America differ widely (Table 2). Chile consistently exhibits the lowest levels of corruption in the region, ranking 20th globally in 2003 (n=133) with a score of 7.4, placing it in the company of such developed

⁶ According to Mario Olivera Prado (2003), the UN will be putting together an international corruption data set based on cases of corruption as part of the UN Convention against Corruption. The data set will classify corruption based on government institutions and social organizations involved and will be presented in a way facilitating cross-national study.

countries as the U.S. (7.5) and Japan (7.0). No Latin America country has ever come close to matching Chile's score. At a second tier, Uruguay and Costa Rica tend to exhibit lower levels of corruption by regional standards. Cuba, first reported in the 2003 index, placed 3rd regionally with a score of 4.6. Most of the remaining countries tend to group together with scores from 2.5 to 4.0. Brazil places 53rd globally along with Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, Mexico ranks 64th with a score slightly above that of China (3.4), and Argentina occupies the 92nd spot in the company of Albania, Ethiopia and Zambia, among others. At the far end of the scale, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Haiti consistently exhibit the highest levels of corruption. With a score of 1.4 Haiti receives the lowest ranking among Latin American countries, placing 131st with a score just above Nigeria's (1.4) and just below that of Paraguay (1.6). A subsequent section explores correlations among the CPI measures and the other measures of corruption discussed here.

[Table 2]

Tables 3 and 4 present results from regional studies. *Latinobarometro* provides multiple indicators of corruption including both types of subjective measures of corruption -- direct experience in corruption and perceptions of corruption -- as well as changes in corruption and (not shown) the extent corruption is considered a national problem. Comparing corruption based on perception of civil servants considered corrupt and direct experience point to some interesting differences among the two measures and vis-à-vis the CPI. Though Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica continue to exhibit the lowest levels of corruption as shown in the CPI measures, countries like Bolivia and Paraguay now rank better than Mexico and Argentina. Data on experience provides even more

contrasts with the CPI. Though again Chile and Uruguay lead the region, Costa Rica now falls to a level similar to Argentina and Panama. In fact, based on the respondents experience with corruption, Paraguay exhibits a lower level of corruption than Costa Rica. At the far end of the scale, Mexico and Brazil, which rank at medium levels in the CPI data, exhibit the highest level of direct experience in corruption. The variable regarding change in turn shows substantial majorities seeing an increases in corruption in both 2000 and 2002. The question of change is explored in a subsequent section.

The other regional, cross-national data by Seligson is shown Table 4. It shows the level of corruption in terms of victimization rates and perception among a subset of countries. Notice that the two types of measures correlate rather weakly and that the levels of corruption based on perception are in turn loosely related to the CPI. Still, the levels based on victimization rates do follow the ordinal pattern of the CPI (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Paraguay). This latter finding, however, suggesting a direct linkage between perception and participation, contrasts the absence of relationship between these two variables in the *Latinobarometro* data.

[Table 3] [Table 4]

As noted, national level data provide greater insights into the nature of political corruption in Latin America. Like any case study, national data can help explore the determinants of public opinion, generate and test higher-level theories, explain outliers, and/or orient qualitative research. While a full exploration of national data is beyond the scope of this research note, data from the Seligson's (2001) study on Colombia and the *Transparencia Mexicana's Encuesta Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno* help illustrate the type of data now available for use in empirical studies. For Colombia,

Seligson's study included telephone surveys of 2,400 respondents in the cities of Bogota, Cali, Medellin and Barranquilla. The data demonstrate, for instance, that direct experiences with corruption is less common than indirect experiences. While 7% of respondents claimed to have been improperly stopped by the police during the previous year and 20% of those offered a bribe to the police, for instance, 14% said they had seen someone paying a bribe and 70% believed that corruption is common or very common in the country. The study also reveals a high level of confidence in the veracity of press reports about corruption, a relatively high degree of knowledge of specific control mechanisms such as the *veedurias*, particularly among the better educated, and an extensive sets of measures of confidence in a wide range of public institutions. Mexico's *Encuesta Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno* represents the first study to measure perceptions and experiences with corruption together in Mexico (Transparencia Mexicana 2001). Based on 13,790 interviews conducted in June and July 2001 by four private firms, the poll details a wide range of views regarding corruption, including the level of corruption in relation to 38 distinct public services and an index of corruption by state (31 states plus the federal district). The survey reveals, for instance, the highest level of corruption at the federal level, though the most common service where bribery occurs is with the (local) transit police; that Mexico City suffers the highest level of corruption and the small southwestern state of Colima, the lowest level.

Measures of Corruption and Related Measures

Looking somewhat closer at the methodological concerns of validity, precision and reliability raised earlier, Table 5 presents a matrix of the CPI since 1995 and the

other measures of corruption discussed thus far (World Bank, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, *Latinobarometro*). It shows, first, an extremely strong correlation among the annual CPI measures, and, second, that despite the different methodologies used, the CPI, the World Bank data, the Opacity index and the *Latinobarometro* measure of perceptions of corrupt civil servants all seem to be tapping into the same underlying phenomenon.⁷ The table also shows no direct correlation between perceived levels of corruption in a country and the percentage of respondents believing that corruption had increased over the prior year, or a respondent's participation in corrupt acts. Though as expected respondents in Chile and Uruguay did have less direct experience in corruption than other countries, in El Salvador only 16% of respondents experienced corruption directly, despite the fact that 74% believed that their civil servants are corrupt. Similarly, respondents in Ecuador and Paraguay – ranked as the most corrupt based on perception-oriented data -- had less direct experience in corruption than in Mexico and Brazil. Though not shown in the data, the TI Global Corruption Report (2000-2001, 226) also notes the absence of any relationship linking perception of corruption as a political problem and the level of corruption based on the *Latiobarometro* data. Whereas 61% of those polled in Mexico in 2000 felt that corruption was a “very serious” problem, for instance, a similar percentage of Chileans saw corruption as “very serious” in their country, despite the fact that the level of corruption in Chile is much less than in Mexico as seen earlier. Such findings highlight some of the different dimensions related to corruption.

[Table 5]

⁷ Some differences, however, are noteworthy. The PriceWaterhouse data places Mexico much higher on the ranking than suggested by the other data bases. In fact, Mexico is just below Chile in this scale of opacity. And though based on quite limited data, Cuba fares better in the CPI scale than in the World Bank data.

Tables 6 and 7, in turn, look first at the relationship among variables used to compile the corruption index and, second, at variables measured alongside the corruption index. As noted earlier, researchers pull together a range of measures relating to different types of corruption to compile the CPI and other such indexes. Such aggregation may lose subtle cross-national differences based on the different types of corruption unless the different types of corruption are strongly linked. Table 6 tests this relationship using the different indicators of corruption from the Global Competitiveness Report of the Economic Forum, one of the polls incorporated into the CPI. The poll presents the perceived level of corruption among businesses in obtaining trade permits, getting utilities connected, in the handling of public contracts, in making tax payments, in the impact of corruption on their business, and in the reduction of frequency corruption. As shown, the pairwise correlations are indeed strong with the exception of reduction in frequency (again, level and change are unrelated). In short, countries with a high level of corruption in obtaining trade permits also exhibit a high level of corruption in other areas.

While Table 6 looks to indicators within the scope of the corruption index, Table 7 looks at measures or indexes slightly beyond the scope of the corruption measures. It shows the relationship among the various indicators of Pricewaterhouse Coopers CLEAR index and two indicators of the World Bank data: corruption and rule of law. As shown, the corruption measures correlate strongly with the legal, economic, accounting and regulatory indexes. Though conceptually different, these measures may also be tapping into a similar phenomenon.

[Table 7]

Corruption and Change

Data used in cross-national empirical studies are static, providing few insights into the nature of change. This is quite significant since methods are sorely needed to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms. Even though the CPI and World Bank data measure corruption at different points in time providing a simple means to calculate changes, both groups provide strong methodological warnings about using their measures in this way. Problems with precision in particular undermine detecting or measuring subtle changes within and among countries over time, as noted earlier. By asking the public directly whether corruption has increased, decreased or remained about the same compared to the previous year, the *Latinobarometro* poll provides a more direct measure of change in corruption. But like the problems with perception, it remains problematic whether the public's perception of change truly reflects a change in corruption or merely an increased level of reporting, or greater media or political attention to the issue.

Cognizant of these warnings and shortcomings, what do the data suggest about change among the countries of Latin America? Table 8 lays out four measures of change: the change in the CPI score from the two earliest to the two latest observations,⁸ the change in World Bank measure of graft/control of corruption from 1997/98 to 2000/01, and the percentage of respondents in the *Latinobarometro* polls of 2000 and 2002 who believed that corruption had increased “a lot” over the prior year. The table groups countries based on average responses to the *Latiobarometro* polls.

⁸ Not all Latin American countries have data for each year of the CPI as indicated in Table 1. For some countries, I calculate change based on the average index for 1995 and 1996 compared to the average for 2001 and 2002. For other countries, however, change may be measured comparing data from 1999-2000 to 2001-2002.

At the broadest level, as noted earlier, the evidence suggests that corruption has grown worse in recent years throughout the region. With the exception of Honduras in 2002, large majorities in all countries (sometimes substantially large majorities) believed that corruption had increased “a lot” over the prior year. If one includes the responses for “a little” increase, this leaves very few believing that corruption had decreased. This was true in both 2000 and 2002, though slightly less so in 2002 (75.3% average in 2000 versus 72.9% in 2002).

As shown by the averages for the three groups, there is somewhat of a rough fit among the various measures. In the first group of countries, where on average over 80% of respondents felt that corruption had increased “a lot,” the World Bank measure of corruption fell in five of the seven cases. Changes in the CPI were more varied with a decline in corruption in 4 of the 7. In the second grouping of countries where between 70-80% of the respondents believed that corruption had increased “a lot,” the World Bank data are again relatively consistent showing an overall improvement in control of corruption for these countries. With the exception of El Salvador, however, the CPI scores fell, suggesting an increase. In fact according to the CPI, corruption increased in these countries on average more than it did the for the first group. Finally, the third grouping shows countries where on average less than 70% of the respondents believed that corruption had increased “a lot” over the previous year. Here the World Bank index was consistent, improving for all these countries, and with the exception of Peru, all the countries in this group enjoyed an improvement in their CPI score: an increase well beyond those of the other two groups. In sum, the table shows certain consistencies,

helping to differentiate somewhat the patterns of change among the countries of Latin America.⁹

[Table 8]

The lack of positive change and a probable worsening of corruption in Latin America over recent years may be considered somewhat surprising given, first, the spread of democracy and liberal reforms, and second, the fact that all the countries of the region are party to the 1996 Inter-American Anti-Corruption Convention (IACC): the first such treaty of its kind (Husted 2002). Still, such quantitative findings are supported by the various qualitative studies (Fleisher 2002; Geddes and Neto 1992; Manzetti 1994; Manzetti and Blake 1996; Rosenn and Downes 1998; Tulchin and Espach 2000; Weyland 1998). Indeed, in their analysis of corruption in South America, Wills and Urueña (2003, 103) posit, “More than a decade after the transition to democracy planted hopes of reform, the region continues to be preyed upon by networks of elites who abuse their positions for illicit gain.” Writing on Central American and Mexico, Rodas-Martini (2003, 90) similarly notes that the emergence of anti-corruption initiatives “has not generally been accompanied by appreciable improvements in government transparency.” Of course, as Susan Rose-Ackerman (1999: 226) advises, “Corruption cannot be expected to wither away just because a reform government has taken power...”

Conclusion

⁹ Regression based on these variables reveals only weak correlations. As warned by others, the reliability of using the data to determine change remains limited.

Perhaps they confirm what we already know, but data on corruption have nonetheless altered the equation. At the scholarly level, data have fed empirical analyses into the causes and consequences of corruption, testing once dormant hypotheses from the comparative literature (see a review see Ades and Di Tella 1997, Lambsdorff 1999, Mauro 1995, 1998, Montinola and Jackman 2002). In many ways, however, data have yet to be fully mined, particularly as it relates to corruption in Latin America. This means that the extent to which the countries of Latin America fit or depart from broader international patterns remains largely unexplored.¹⁰

At a more practical, political level, two related trends are apparent. First, the data – usually in mere descriptive form – have galvanized political activists both nationally and internationally to push for political reforms. This increasing attention to corruption marks local and international NGOs like TI as well as IGOs like the IMF, the World Bank, the OAS and the UN. Such political pressures, in turn, paired with local political developments, have forced local governments to make fighting corruption a priority -- at least rhetorically-- to develop high-profile anti-corruption programs, and to devote political and economic resources to the task. It is here where the second trend becomes apparent: the use of the data in somewhat more sophisticated ways as a diagnostic device to help inform and design programs and, post-hoc, to test their effectiveness. Data from the Mexican surveys, for instance, helped the Fox government design programs in target

¹⁰ This is less true of the national data where some empirical studies have emerged. Camp, Coleman and Davis (1999), for example, explore factors influencing perceptions of corruption in Mexico, Morris (2003) analyzes state-level corruption in Mexico, Rehen (1997) studies the types of corruption and the actors involved in denouncing it in Chile, and Seligson (2001, 2002) examines the impact of corruption on feelings of trust and legitimacy cross-nationally. Even so much more can and should be done using national-level data.

areas, including a huge public education program to try to alter the underlying political culture.

Of course, care is needed in all three areas now galvanized by the emergence of measures of corruption. Too often methodological issues and problems are ignored or minimized when data help promote a particular theoretical or political position. As noted, despite the growing availability of data, useful for making some general conclusions, many questions regarding the validity and precision of the data remain. The high-profile release of the CPI in 2002 showing that Mexico had fallen ever so slightly since 2001, for instance, triggered considerable debate in Mexico over the “ineffectiveness” of President Fox’s anti-corruption campaign, despite the fact that such subtle changes in the CPI may mean very little and/or that reforms may take time to truly make a difference. By the same token, theoretical issues and problems like causality are often ignored or minimized when one uses data to promote a particular position. The notion that corruption undermines foreign investment based on large cross-national studies, for instance, may not hold true at the regional level even though it may inform government actions or the policies of IFIs. But despite these problems, the attention to corruption and the continuing efforts to create and refine ways of measuring it both reflect and feed the growing scholarly and political importance of this once neglected phenomenon.

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
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Tables Table 1. Sources of Data for Countries of Latin America for the 2003 CPI

<p>Source: “World Competitiveness Report” (Institute for Management Development)</p> <p>Year(s): 2001, 2002 and 2003</p> <p>Sample: executives in top and middle management in domestic and international companies. (n=3,678 in 2001; n=3,532 in 2002; n=>4,000 in 2003)</p> <p>Questions: the occurrence of bribery and corruption in the public sphere and the economy</p> <p>Number of countries: 49 (2001); 49 (2002); 51 (2003)</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela</p>
<p>Source: “Global Competitiveness Report” (World Economic Forum)</p> <p>Year(s): 2001, 2002 and 2003</p> <p>Sample: senior business leaders in domestic and international companies (n=4,022 in 2001; n=ca. 4,600 in 2002; n=7,4410 in 2003)</p> <p>Questions: the existence of undocumented extra payments connected with import and export permits, public utilities, contracts, licenses, taxes or loan application and, in beginning in 2003, payments connected to favorable regulations and judicial decisions.</p> <p>Number of countries: 59 (2001); 76 (2002); 102 (2003)</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.</p>
<p>Source: “World Business Environment Survey” (World Bank)</p> <p>Year: 200*</p> <p>Sample: 10,090 senior managers</p> <p>Questions: the “frequency of bribing” and “corruption as a constraint on business”</p> <p>Number of countries: 79</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</p>
<p>Source: “Country Risk Service” and “Country Forecast” (Economist Intelligence Unit)</p> <p>Year: 200*</p> <p>Sample: expert staff</p> <p>Questions: pervasiveness of corruption among public officials</p> <p>Number of countries: 139</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</p>
<p>Source: “Opacity Index” (Pricewaterhouse Cooper)</p> <p>Year: 2003</p> <p>Sample: CFOs, equity analysts, bankers and PwC staff (n=1,357)</p> <p>Questions: the frequency of corruption in various contexts such as obtaining import/export permits, avoiding taxes, etc.</p> <p>Number of countries: 34</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela</p>
<p>Source: “State Capacity Survey” (Columbia University)</p> <p>Year: 2002</p> <p>Sample: US resident country experts (n=224)</p> <p>Questions: severity of corruption within the state</p> <p>Number of countries: 95</p> <p>– in LA: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela.</p>

Figure 1.
Regional Comparison of Corruption (2000 and 2003)



2000 (from Lambsdorff 2000)

Asia (n=12). Range: Singapore 9.1 to Indonesia 1.7

Central & Eastern Europe (n=16) Range: Estonia 5.7 to Yugoslavia 1.3

Sub-Saharan Africa (n=19) Range: Botswana 6.0 to Nigeria 1.2

Western Europe (n=18) Range: Finland 10.0 to Italy 4.6

Latin America (n=11) Range: Chile 7.4 to Ecuador 2.6

2003a (same countries used in Lambsdorff 2000)

Asia (n=12). Range: Singapore 9.4 to Indonesia 1.9

Central & Eastern Europe (n=16) Range: Estonia 5.5 to Serbia and Montenegro 2.3

Sub-Saharan Africa (n=19) Range: Botswana 5.5 to Nigeria 1.4

Western Europe (n=18) Range: Finland 9.7 to Italy 5.3

Latin America (n=11) Range: Chile 7.4 to Ecuador 2.2

2003b (all countries)

Asia (n=34) range Singapore 9.4 to Bangladesh 1.3

C/E Europe (n=21) range Slovenia 5.9 to Georgia 1.8

Sub-Saharan Africa (n=24) range Botswana 5.7 to Nigeria 1.4

Western Europe (n=18) range Finland 9.7 to Greece 4.3

Latin America (n=20) Chile 7.4 to Haiti 1.4

Figure 2.
Corruption and Human Development (Johnston 1999)




Table 2. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Latin America)

(0 = most corrupt; 10 = least corrupt)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Argentina	5.24	3.41	2.81	3.0	3.1	3.5	3.5	2.8	2.5
Bolivia		3.40	2.05	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.0	2.2	2.3
Brazil	2.70	2.96	3.56	4.0	4.1	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9
Chile	7.94	6.80	6.05	6.8	6.9	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4
Colombia	3.44	2.73	2.23	2.2	2.9	3.2	3.8	3.6	3.7
Costa Rica				5.6	5.1	5.4	4.5	4.5	4.3
Cuba									4.6
Dominican R.							3.1	3.5	3.3
Ecuador		3.19		2.3	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.2
El Salvador				3.6	3.9	4.1	3.6	3.4	3.7
Guatemala				3.1	3.2	2.9	2.5		2.4
Honduras				1.7	1.8		2.7	2.7	2.3
Jamaica									3.8
Mexico	3.18	3.30	2.66	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.6
Nicaragua					3.1		2.4	2.5	2.6
Panama							3.7	3.0	3.4
Paraguay				1.5	2.0			1.7	1.6
Peru				4.5		4.4	4.1	4.0	3.7
Uruguay			4.14	4.3				5.1	5.5
Venezuela	2.66	2.50	2.77	2.3		2.7	2.8	2.5	2.4

Regional CPI RANKINGS based on average for the 1995-2003 period

	Avg.	Range	N years
1. Chile	7.13	6.0-7.9	(9)
2. Costa Rica	4.90	4.3-5.6	(6)
3. Cuba	4.60	4.6-4.6	(1)
4. Uruguay	4.75	4.1-5.5	(4)
5. Peru	4.14	3.7-4.5	(5)
6. Jamaica	3.80	3.8-3.8	(1)
7. El Salvador	3.72	3.6-4.1	(6)
8. Brazil	3.69	2.7-4.1	(9)
9. Panama	3.37	3.0-3.7	(3)
10. Argentina	3.34	2.8-5.2	(9)
10. Mexico	3.34	2.7-3.7	(9)
12. DR	3.30	3.1-3.5	(3)
13. Colombia	3.08	2.2-3.8	(9)
14. Guatemala	2.82	2.4-3.2	(5)
15. Nicaragua	2.65	2.4-3.1	(4)
16. Venezuela	2.59	2.3-2.8	(8)
17. Bolivia	2.49	2.0-3.4	(8)
18. Ecuador	2.46	2.2-3.2	(7)
19. Honduras	2.24	1.7-2.7	(5)
20. Paraguay	1.70	1.5-2.0	(4)

(Table 2 continued)**2003 CPI with ranking (n=133), number of polls, standard deviation and confidence intervals**

	CPI score	Ranking	Polls	SD	90% Confidence Interval
Chile	7.4	20	12	0.9	5.6 – 8.8
Uruguay	5.5	33	7	1.1	4.1 - 7.4
Cuba	4.6	41	3	1.0	3.6 – 5.5
Costa Rica	4.3	48	8	0.7	3.5 – 5.5
Brazil	3.9	53	12	0.5	3.3 – 4.7
Colombia	3.7	57	11	0.5	2.7 – 4.4
Jamaica	3.8	57	5	0.4	3.3 – 4.3
Peru	3.7	57	9	0.6	2.7 – 4.9
El Salvador	3.7	59	7	1.5	2.0 – 6.3
Mexico	3.6	59	12	0.6	2.4 – 4.9
Panama	3.4	64	7	0.8	2.7 – 5.0
DR	3.3	66	6	0.4	2.7 – 3.8
Nicaragua	2.6	88	7	0.5	2.0 – 3.3
Argentina	2.5	92	12	0.5	1.6 – 3.2
Guatemala	2.4	100	8	0.6	1.5 – 3.4
Venezuela	2.4	100	12	0.5	1.4 – 3.1
Bolivia	2.3	106	6	0.4	1.9 – 2.9
Honduras	2.3	106	7	0.6	1.4 – 3.3
Ecuador	2.2	113	8	0.3	1.8 – 2.6
Paraguay	1.6	129	6	0.3	1.2 – 2.0

Source: Transparency International (www.ti.org)

Table 3.
***Latinobarometro* questions on corruption**

	Percent saying that in the past 12 months corruption has increased				% w/direct <u>Experience</u> (2002)	% civil <u>Servants corrupt</u> (2002)
	<u>a lot</u>	<u>a little</u>	<u>a lot</u>	<u>a little</u>		
	(2000)		(2002)			
Argentina	87	5	90	3	25	89
Bolivia	83	8	80	8	20	76
Brazil	85	5	78	6	61	61
Chile	60	15	58	13	13	48
Colombia	80	9	85	4	19	78
Costa Rica	89	5	83	6	24	58
Ecuador	87	5	82	9	21	85
El Salvador	72	14	74	7	16	74
Guatemala	63	13	84	5	31	79
Honduras	91	4	27	11	23	74
México	56	19	61	14	59	77
Nicaragua	92	2	65	5	41	68
Panama	72	11	79	10	23	71
Paraguay	92	2	95	3	22	74
Peru	56	18	62	10	25	67
Uruguay	62	20	63	19	13	52
Venezuela	54	11	73	7	27	67

Source: Lagos (2003)

Table 4. Measures of Corruption from Seligson (2002)

	% corruption victims	perception of corruption	CPI
El Salvado	6	71.0 (1999)	3.9
Nicaragua	16	69.4 (1998)	3.1 (1999)
Bolivia	25	63.6 (1998)	2.8
Paraguay	28	77.2 (1998)	1.5
Honduras		69.1 (2000)	2.7 (2001)
Colombia		65.4 (2001)	3.2

Table 5
Matrix of Corruption Indicators

	CPI96	CPI97	CPI98	CPI99	CPI00	CPI01	CPI02	CPI03
CPI95	.934**	.804*	.806*	.789	.889**	.869*	.800*	.803*
CPI96		.888**	.927**	.900**	.938**	.856**	.873**	.876**
CPI97			.960**	.994**	.966**	.938**	.942**	.925**
CPI98				.981**	.965**	.868**	.892**	.875**
CPI99					.990**	.922**	.935**	.943**
CPI00						.949**	.956**	.947**
CPI01							.974**	.976**
CPI02								.987**

CPI (Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index)

	CC98	CC01	OF	DE	CS	CI00	CI02
CPI avg	.939**	.944**	-.880**	-.200	-.733**	-.412	-.196
CC98		.931**	-.854**	-.124	-.742**	-.299	-.089
CC01			-.869**	-.182	-.803**	-.339	-.219
OF				.085	.646*	.464	.762**
DE					.085	.006	-.037
CI00							.207

CPI avg (average of CPI measures from 1995-2003)

CC98 / CC01 (World Bank Governance Indicator on Graft/ Control of Corruption for 1998 and 2001)

OF (Index of opacity for Corruption, PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

DE (Direct Experience of corruption by *Latinobarometro* for 2002)

CS (Proportion of Civil Servants perceived to be corrupt by *Latinobarometro* for 2002)

CI00 / CI02 (Increase in corruption in past year by *Latinobarometro* for 2000 and 2002)

** $p > .01$ * $p < .05$ (1-tailed)

Table 6. Global Competitive ness Report Measures of Corruption

	Con. utilities	Public contracts	Tax Payments	Impact on bus.	Reduction in frequency
Trade permits	.675**	.860**	.922**	.825**	.338
Con. utilities		.520*	.695**	.586**	.194
Public contracts			.914**	.942**	.443*
Tax payments				.897**	.221
Impact on business					.436*

Table 7. Corruption and Related Indicators

	RL98	RL01	OL	OE	OA	OR
CPI avg	.801**	.841**	-.975**	-.812**	-.517	-.846**
CC98	.806**	.855**	-.940**	-.840**	-.478	-.792**
CC01	.828*8	.886**	-.939**	-.807**	-.496	-.828**
CS	-.602**	-.638**	.727*	.538	.235	.644*
OC	-.610*	-.660*	.901**	.818**	.743*	.923**

RL98 / RL 01 (World Bank Governance Indicator on Rule of Law for 1998 and 2001)

OL (Index of opacity in the Legal system, PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

OE (Index of opacity in Economic Regulations, PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

OA (Index of opacity in Accounting Practices, PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

OR (Index of opacity in bureaucratic Regulations, PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

CPI avg. (average of CPI measures from 1995-2003)

CC98 / CC01 (World Bank Governance Indicator on Graft/ Control of Corruption for 1998 and 2001)

OF (Opacity Factor by PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

CS (Proportion of Civil Servants perceived to be corrupt by *Latinobarometro* for 2002)

** p > .01 * p < .05 (1-tailed)

Table 8. Change in Corruption: Various Measures

	Percent saying that in the past 12 months corruption has increased a lot ⁺		Change in	
	<u>2000</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>CPI 99-03</u>	<u>Control of Corruption 97/98 – 01/02</u>
Paraguay	92	95	.10	-.01
Argentina	87	90	-.20	-.09
Costa Rica	89	83	-1.30	.29
Ecuador	87	82	-.10	-.16
Colombia	80	85	1.50	.10
Bolivia	83	80	-.50	-.28
Brazil	85	78	-.10	-.08
Avg.	86	85	-.09	-.03
El Salvador	72	74	.10	.02
Guatemala	63	84	-.70	.13
Nicaragua	92	65	-.50	.04
Panama	72	79	-.30*	.01
Avg.	75	75	-.35	.05
Venezuela	54	73	.10	.13
Uruguay	62	63	1.20	.28
Peru	56	62	-.70**	.16
Chile	60	58	.60	.37
México	56	61	.30	.00
Honduras	91	27	.60	.31
Avg.	63	57	.35	.21

* 2001-2003

**2000-2003

⁺ *Latiobarometro* (Lagos 2003)

Appendix

**Appendix Table 1. World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey 2001-2002.
(country ranking)**

	<u>Frequency of bribes in different activities</u>					Impact of third parties' corruption on own business
	Trade Permits	connection to utilities	public contracts	tax payments	reduction in frequency	
Argentina	67	32	66	61	45	69
Bolivia	63	33	72	64	68	61
Brazil	41	49	44	56	11	51
Chile	9	13	24	16	59	31
Colombia	40	35	52	52	54	52
Costa Rica	49	43	38	43	37	42
Cuba						
Dominican R.	46	41	48	54	14	57
Ecuador	54	67	63	62	60	70
El Salvador	50	36	53	57	16	53
Guatemala	60	50	68	63	72	72
Honduras	65	69	64	65	61	62
Jamaica	47	47	33	39	56	37
Mexico	45	60	41	49	20	46
Nicaragua	68	63	65	68	70	73
Panama	57	54	61	59	64	66
Paraguay	75	74	73	74	73	75
Peru	34	30	39	38	65	50
Uruguay	43	39	35	44	35	39
Venezuela	66	53	57	67	67	65

Source: Executive Opinion Survey, *GCR 2001-2002*, World Economic Forum.

Appendix Table 2. World Bank Governance Indicators 1997-98 and 2000-01 for Latin America
Scale of -2.5 to 2.5 (ranking based on 00/01 data)

	Graft/ Control of Corruption	
	97/98	00/01
Chile	1.03	1.40
Costa Rica	0.58	0.87
Uruguay	0.43	0.71
Brazil	0.06	-0.02
Peru	-0.20	-0.04
Cuba	0.27	-0.12
Dominican R	-0.77	-0.20
México	-0.28	-0.28
El Salvador	-0.35	-0.33
Argentina	-0.27	-0.36
Colombia	-0.49	-0.39
Panama	-0.46	-0.45
Venezuela	-0.72	-0.59
Honduras	-0.94	-0.63
Guatemala	-0.82	-0.69
Bolivia	-0.44	-0.72
Nicaragua	-0.84	-0.80
Paraguay	-0.96	-0.97
Ecuador	-0.82	-0.98

Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002)

Appendix Table 3. Opacity Measures (PriceWaterhouse Coopers)

	*C(orrupcion)	O-factor	Tax-Equivalent %	Opacity Risk Premium
Chile	30	36	5	3.00
Mexico	42	48	15	3.08
Uruguay	44	53	19	4.52
Peru	46	58	23	5.63
Colombia	48	60	25	6.32
Argentina	56	61	25	6.39
Brazil	53	61	25	6.45
Venezuela	53	63	27	7.33
Guatemala		65	28	7.49
Ecuador	60	68	31	8.26

O-factor is a composite measure of corruption, the legal system, government macroeconomic and fiscal policies, accounting standards and practices and the regulatory regime. The tax equivalent represents a measure of the additional cost to investments as a result of opacity. The risk premium similarly gauges the investment risk owing to opacity.

Source: PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2001)

**Appendix Table 4. Encuesta Nacional de Corrupción y Buen Gobierno (Mexico)
(selected questions)**

Generally, where would you say corruption is initiated?	
31.5%	public official
32.3%	citizen
35.2%	both
In your opinion, eliminating corruption in Mexico is	
5.4%	very possible
33.2%	possible
36.8%	not very possible
24.6%	impossible
How much would you agree or disagree with the idea of a public official taking advantage of his position as long as he does good things?	
52.7%	agree
40.3%	disagree
Among those involved in a case of corruption that did not file a complaint: why did you not file a complaint? (top responses)	
22.7%	to avoid problems/fear of reprisals
16.8%	not worth the trouble / futile
14.3%	did not know how or where to go
11.8%	the procedure is difficult
<u>Public Services and Bribes</u>	
<u>Most Frequent Payment</u>	
<u>Service</u>	<u>index</u>
• Process to recover a stolen auto	30.29
• Process to pass goods through customs, checkpoint or border crossing	28.47
• File a complaint, file charges, or to get authorities to follow a case	28.26
<u>Least Frequent Payment</u>	
<u>Service</u>	<u>index</u>
• Process related to telephone service	2.91
• Process to obtain a health-related note	2.79
• Process relating to property	1.55
<u>Most and Least Corrupt by State/Entity</u>	
	<u>index</u>
Federal District	22.62
Mexico	16.95
Guerrero	13.39

Aguascalientes	4.53
Baja California Sur	3.88
Colima	2.96

