A group of Jehovah's Witnesses carried signs, such as the ones above, reading “Religion is a Snare and a Racket” and on the reverse “Serve God and Christ the King” during a parade in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1939. Their efforts, not uncommon in these days, were intended to urge people to flee "false religion." However, members of the picketers in Manchester were convicted because they did not obtain the proper parade permit. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, saying the permit process was valid under the First Amendment and did not discriminate based on viewpoint. (Photo, screenshot from YouTube).
In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a number of Jehovah’s Witnesses for parading without a permit, ruling that their First Amendments rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly had not been violated.
A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses had peacefully paraded single file on a sidewalk in Manchester, New Hampshire, carrying signs and handing out leaflets announcing a meeting. They had not secured the requisite permit. They invoked their First Amendment rights and argued that the permit requirement vested undue authority in the licensing authority and was “vague and indefinite.”
In the opinion for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes rejected the assertion that the case involved “freedom of worship.”
According to the Court, the permit requirement did not evidence interference with worship but was “only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades or processions.”
Court reasoned parade permitting process did not discrimate based on content
In brief, the Jehovah’s Witnesses had not been prosecuted for the content of their expression but for parading without a permit. Hughes observed that constitutional civil liberties “imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.”
He further noted, “The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.” Permits would enable preparation for contingencies necessitated by demonstrations and were valid “time, place and manner” restrictions.
Hughes also rejected the idea that permit fees, ranging from a nominal amount to $300, were unreasonable and asserted that a flat fee would not as easily allow the city to adapt to contingencies.
He distinguished this decision from those concerning peaceful assembly in Lovell v. City of Griffin (1946), Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (1939), Schneider v. State (1939), Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), Thornhill v. Alabama (1940), and Carlson v. California (1940).Send Feedback on this article