Published Research by PERI Scholars
Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions
Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable monetary institutions.
The Political Economy of Public Pensions
By Daniel J. Smith and Eileen Norcross, 2021
Public pensions in the United States face an impending funding crisis in the wake of the Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 Recession. Many cities and states will struggle to meet these growing obligations without major cuts in government services, reneging on pension promises, or raising taxes. This monograph examines the development of the pension crisis through the lens of political economy. We analyze the knowledge and incentive problems inherent in the institutional structure, governance, and accounting of public pensions. We conclude by offering several institutional, governance, and reporting reforms to the pension funding crisis.
Although the state has recently taken some steps in the right direction when it comes to education policy, Tennessee’s math and reading assessments indicated that only 36 percent of students performed at or above grade level in the 2018-19 school year.” In his research, Dr. DeAngelis finds “the state could provide schools with stronger incentives to spend K-12 education dollars wisely” through a variety of proposed methods, including an expansion of access to public charter schools and private school choice programs. “These types of educational options could improve student outcomes while empowering families. The education policy study and related webinar event is made possible by the generous support of Jay and Jackie Archer, and Cyndi and Dr. Tracy Miller.
Tennessee Public Pensions: A Model for Pension Reform
By Tom Savidge, August 2020
Tennessee’s public pension system recent reforms passed in 2014 have helped make Tennessee one of the best public pension systems in the United States. This paper will first examine the reforms made by Tennessee. The sections that follow will examine how Tennessee’s public pension plans have fared compared to other states that have made reforms (i.e. Michigan and Wisconsin) and states where no reforms to defined benefit pension plans have been made (i.e. Alabama, Connecticut, and Illinois) in terms of contribution rates, funding ratios, and liability valuations. The second part of this paper will make recommendations for future reform that will help keep Tennessee one of the most competitive public pension plans in the United States. https://jewlscholar.mtsu.edu/handle/mtsu/6292
- Piano, Ennio E. (2021). Organizing high-end restaurants. Economics of Governance, forthcoming.
- Piano, Ennio E. (2021). In persona Christi Capitis: Agency problems when God is the principal. Journal of Economics, Management, and Religion, forthcoming.
- Piano, Ennio E., and Al-Bawwab, Rania (2021). The artist as entrepreneur. Review of Austrian Economics, forthcoming.
- (Journal of Government Financial Management, 69 (4).
- Leeson, Peter T., and Piano, Ennio E. (2020). The Golden Age of Mercenaries. European Review of Economic History, forthcoming.
- Piano, Ennio E. (2020) "Coase goes to war: Contract choice on the battlefield." Revue d'Economie Politique, forthcoming.
- Piano, Ennio E., and Salter, Alexander W. (2020). The fundamental Coase of development: Property rights foundations of the effective state. Journal of Institutional Economics, forthcoming.
- Rouanet, Louis, and Piano, Ennio E. (2020). Filling the ranks. European Review of Economic History, forthcoming.
- Piano, Ennio E. (2020). Desertion as theft. Journal of Institutional Economics, 16(2), 169-183.
- Piano, Ennio E., and Carson, Trey. (2020). Scalp-taking. Rationality and Society, 32(1), 40–66.
- Smith, Daniel J.; Crowley, George R.; Leguizamon, Sebastian J. (2020). Long Live the Doge? Death as a Term Limit on Venetian Chief Executives. Public Choice, forthcoming.
- Smith, Daniel J. (2018) Turn-taking in Office. Constitutional Political Economy, Forthcoming
Abstract: Immigration and foreign efficiency have increased domestic labor market competition and displaced native workers. Populist rhetoric identifies immigrants, outsourcing, and trade deficits as the causes for voter’s socioeconomic ...
(SSRN Working Paper, 2020-05-18)Abstract: With national government audit quality concerns mounting, we utilized data from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC) to evaluate the variation in local government audit findings in Tennessee compared to other states. ...
(SSRN Working Paper, 2020-02)Abstract: The ability to mobilize large armies for the purposes of national defense and territorial expansion is a key feature of the modern state. Post-revolutionary France was among the first European powers to adopt large-scale ...
(SSRN Working Paper, 2018-08-29)Abstract: Can committee election and rotation (CER) for public office supplement formal terms and term limits to achieve more frequent office rotation without incurring, to the same extent, the associated turnover costs of a term ...
(SSRN Working Paper, 2018-08-29)Abstract: Can informal term limits place binding constraints on executives? And, are there conditions under which an electorate would forego formal term limits in favor of informal term limits? Formal term limits face three primary ...